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I. INTRODUCTION
During Jerry White's trial in Florida for capital murder, each
morning the judge required the prosecutor and defense attorney to
come to his chambers.1 During those meetings, the judge had the
state attorney check the defense attorney's breath for alcohol.2 Later,
the defense attorney's investigator said he had witnessed the attorney
shoot up with cocaine during trial recesses and saw him using speed,
Quaaludes, alcohol, morphine, and marijuana after court.3 On De-
cember 4, 1995, Jerry White was executed in Florida.4
In a Texas capital case, George McFarland's lawyer reportedly
slept through most of the trial because he found it "boring."5 The pre-
siding judge stated, "The constitution says everyone's entitled to the
1. Marcia Coyle et al., Trial and Error in the Nation's Death Belt: Fatal Defense
Fatal Flaws, NAT'L L.J., June 11, 1990, at 30.
2. Id. See also White v. State, 664 So. 2d 242, 246 n.4 (1995)(Anstead, J., dissent-
ing)(quoting affidavit submitted by trial prosecutor), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 591
(1995). In an affidavit, the trial prosecutor stated he believed the defendant did
not receive an adequate capital sentencing hearing because of the incompetence
of counsel. Id.
3. Coyle, supra note 1.
4. Debbie Salamone, Jerry White Pays Ultimate Price for '81 Murder, Tim ORLANDo
SENTML, Dec. 5, 1995, at Al.
5. Ian Katz, Reprieve for Man Whose Lawyer Slept, Tim GuA DIAN, April 11, 1995,
at 10 (discussing the stay of execution granted in another capital case where the
attorney slept during the trial). See also Paul M. Barrett, On the Defense: Law-
yer's Fast Work on Death Cases Raises Doubts About System, WALL ST. J., Sept. 7,
1994, at Al (discussing Joe Frank Cannon, a Texas capital defense lawyer who
boasts of hurrying through trials "like greased lightning," has represented ten
people who ended up on death row, and has been accused of sleeping during tri-
als). A recent article noted that '[flor the third time in a year, the [Texas] Court
of Criminal Appeals has refused to overturn a capital murder conviction involv-
ing a lawyer who slept during trial." Janet Elliot & Mark Ballard, No Enhance-
ment of State Jail Felonies; Sleeping in Trial OK, TEXAS LAwYER, Feb. 16, 1996,
at 10.
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attorney of their choice. The constitution doesn't say the lawyer has to
be awake."6
Unfortunately, indigent criminal defendants are not always pro-
vided with competent appointed counsel. Sometimes they are not
even appointed attorneys who remain alert or sober during trial.
In the courts, the guarantee of a constitutional right to effective
assistance of counsel is a relatively recent development. The test for
effective assistance was announced by the United States Supreme
Court in 1984 in Strickland v. Washington.7 This test has been criti-
cized as allowing slipshod representation of indigent defendants be-
cause it creates a presumption that counsel was competent and places
the burden of showing prejudice upon the defendant.
For example, in situations where a defense attorney was drunk,
abusing drugs, or otherwise mentally impaired during trial, courts ap-
plying the Strickland test do not find ineffective assistance of counsel
unless a defendant can make the difficult showing that counsel's con-
duct was deficient and such conduct more likely than not altered the
outcome of the case. Similarly, in most cases where a defendant
claims that defense counsel slept during trial, courts have applied the
Strickland test, although a few courts have carved out a very narrow
exception for certain sleeping situations.
There are certain situations where courts do not place such a high
burden on defendants. Courts have not required defendants to make
the Strickland showing of prejudice where the defendant actually or
effectively had no counsel, where defense counsel was not licensed to
practice law, where counsers performance or behavior was extremely
egregious, or where counsel had a conflict of interest. As discussed
below, the mental impairment and sleeping counsel cases are more
comparable to some of these categories than they are with the Strick-
land cases involving the presence of sober and alert counsel through-
out trial.
In Part II, this Article presents a brief history of the right to coun-
sel in the United States and the development of a right to effective
assistance of counsel. The standard announced by the United States
Supreme Court in Strickland and some of the criticisms of the Strick-
land test are also discussed. In Part III, this Article discusses excep-
tions to the Strickland ineffective assistance of counsel test and what
those exceptions have in common. In Part IV, this Article examines
the cases involving ineffective assistance of counsel claims where
counsel was sleeping or otherwise mentally impaired. In Part V, this
Article examines the existing framework of the Strickland test and its
exceptions. It specifically addresses the mental impairment cases in
6. Katz, supra note 5, at 10.
7. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
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the context of this framework and proposes a standard for cases in-
volving sleeping counsel and a standard for cases involving counsel
who abuse drugs or alcohol during trial.
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE RIGHT TO COMPETENT
COUNSEL AND A COMPETENCY STANDARD
A. Background
1. The Right to Counsel
Before there was a right to "competent" counsel, there had to be a
right to counsel. The Sixth Amendment provides that a criminal de-
fendant has a right to "the assistance of counsel for his defence."8 The
question of who is entitled to the right to appointed counsel has been
answered only relatively recently.9
The first important United States Supreme Court case establishing
a right to appointment of counsel for indigent defendants in state
cases was Powell v. AlabamalO in which the Court held that the Four-
teenth Amendment's due process clause required that an attorney be
appointed for indigent capital defendants under certain circum-
stances. It would be difficult to find a better argument for a right to
counsel than the facts in Powell. In March 1931, during the Great
Depression, a deputy sheriff and a posse of white men arrested a
group of nine black teenagers in a small Alabama town, after some
white youths complained that the black youths had thrown them off a
8. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Sixth Amendment:
embodies a realistic recognition of the obvious truth that the average
defendant does not have the professional legal skill to protect himself
when brought before a tribunal with power to take his life or liberty,
wherein the prosecution is presented by experienced and learned
counsel.
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462-63 (1938). Interestingly, in at least twelve
of the thirteen original colonies, the right to counsel was recognized in all crimi-
nal prosecutions, although in a few colonies the right was limited to more serious
crimes. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 65 (1932). This practice in the colonies,
as well as the Sixth Amendment, rejected the English rule that allowed the com-
plete assistance of counsel in misdemeanor trials, but denied defendants the
right to use counsel at felony trials, except for arguments on legal questions. See
2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 11.1, at 3
(1984).
9. "Only recently have we even recognized that the lack of effective counsel inevita-
bly deprives the poor of the right to a fair trial. For a great many years, the
shameful truth was that only the rich could obtain counsel, since only the rich
could afford to pay counsel." United States v. Decoster, 624 F.2d 196, 265 (D.C.
1979)(Bazelon, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 944 (1979).
10. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
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train.X' Allegations of rape by two white women resulted in the nine
young men being tried and eight of them being sentenced to death by
an all-white jury, although facts would later emerge that showed the
allegations were fabricated.12 The "Scottsboro boys," as they would
become known, were from out of state and illiterate. 13 The "proceed-
ings, from beginning to end, took place in an atmosphere of tense, hos-
tile, and excited public sentiment'14 and the defendants narrowly
escaped being lynched before trial.'5
In Powell, the United States Supreme Court addressed the cases of
three of the young men who were sentenced to death in the state
court. Although the Powell defendants were represented at trial, the
Court found no effective appointment had been made before trial, as
the trial judge said "that he had appointed all the members of the bar
for the purpose of arraigning the defendants and then of course antici-
pated that the members of the bar would continue to help the defend-
ants if no counsel appeared.'l6 The Supreme Court found there was a
Due Process right to counsel derived from the right to a fair hearing
and held that the Scottsboro defendants' right to appointed counsel
was violated.17 However, the Court limited its holding to the facts of
the case, noting that it was only deciding that "in a capital case, where
the defendant is unable to employ counsel, and is incapable ade-
quately of making his own defense because of ignorance, feeble-mind-
edness, illiteracy, or the like," the trial court has a duty to appoint
counsel.' 8 Significantly, the Court implied some sort of competency
requirement in noting that the duty to appoint counsel "is not dis-
charged by an assignment at such a time or under such circumstances
as to preclude the giving of effective aid in the preparation and trial of
the case."' 9
Soon after Powell, the Court examined the right to counsel in fed-
eral courts in the context of the Sixth Amendment and, in Johnson v.
Zerbst,20 extended the right to appointed counsel to all federal crimes
11. MICHAEL L. RADELET ET AL., IN SPrrE OF INNOCENCE 116 (1992). See DAN T.
CARTER, ScoTrsBoRo: A TRAGEDY OF THE ARICAN SouTH (revised ed. 1979);
JAES GOODAN, STonmEs OF ScoTrsBoRo (1994).
12. RADELET ET AL., supra note 11, at 118.
13. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 52 (1932).
14. Id. at 51.
15. GOODmAN, supra note 11, at 130-32, 175.
16. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45,49 (1932). Some representation was provided by
70-year-old Milo Moody, who was lured by the fee to take the case even though
the six other members of the local bar refused to represent the defendants. A
Chattanooga attorney reluctantly assisted him. RADELET ET AL., supra note 11,
at 117.
17. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 65 (1932).
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
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involving incarceration. The Court noted that assistance of counsel is
so fundamental that it is "an essential jurisdictional prerequisite to a
federal court's authority to deprive an accused of his life or liberty."21
Soon after, however, the Court rejected a state defendant's request
to expand the scope of the Due Process right to counsel to match the
Johnson federal standard. In 1942, in Betts v. Brady,22 the Court held
that due process only required the appointment of counsel in state
court where the totality of the facts in a given case indicates the indi-
gent defendant needs counsel in order to have a fair trial. Commenta-
tors criticized the Betts special circumstances test because "it was
virtually impossible to render a retrospective judgment that a defend-
ant forced to proceed pro se had not been prejudiced by lack of
counsel."23
In 1963, however, the Court overruled Betts in Gideon v. Wain-
wright24 and created aper se Fourteenth Amendment right to counsel
for all state felony defendants. 25 Later, the Court extended this right
to counsel to misdemeanor defendants receiving jail sentences in
Argersinger v. Hamlin.26 Ultimately, the Court extended the right to
counsel to all "critical stages" in the criminal prosecution. 27
21. Id. at 467. Also in Johnson, the Court held that the Sixth Amendment included
the right to appointed counsel as well as the right to retained counsel. Id.
22. 316 U.S. 455, 462 (1942). In Betts, the Court affirmed the robbery conviction of
the petitioner, who had to act as his own attorney when denied his request for
counsel. Betts also contained an extensive discussion of state laws regarding the
right to counsel at the time. Id. at 467-72.
23. LAFAvE & ISRAEL, supra note 8, at 6. Note that this criticism of the Betts stan-
dard parallels the criticism of the prejudice standard of the present ineffective
assistance of counsel test.
24. 372 U.S. 335, 345 (1963)(overruling Betts and holding that the Sixth Amendment
guarantee of counsel is a fundamental right). Because Gideon made the right to
counsel obligatory in state courts through the Fourteenth Amendment, essen-
tially the same constitutional standards apply in both state and federal prosecu-
tions. S.R. Shapiro, Annotation, Accused's Right to Counsel Under the Federal
Constitution-Supreme Court Cases, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1420, 1423 (1996). See Esco-
bedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 491 (1964)(Sixth Amendment right to counsel ap-
plies to states via the Fourteenth Amendment). For a more detailed discussion of
Gideon, see Anthony Lewis's famous book about the decision and the events lead-
ing up to it. AmONY LEWis, GIDEoN's TRuMPET (Vintage Books 1989)(1964).
25. The court continued to stress the importance of the right to counsel in other
cases. In Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963), the Court held the Four-
teenth Amendment guarantees the right to counsel to a criminal defendant in the
first appeal as of right. In Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23 n.8 (1967), the
Court acknowledged that the right to assistance of counsel at trial was so basic to
a fair trial that a violation of that right can never be treated as harmless error.
26. 407 U.S. 25 (1972). Cf Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979)(holding that Sixth
Amendment right to counsel does not extend to indigent defendants where im-
prisonment is not actually imposed).
27. LAFAvE & ISRAEL, supra note 8, § 11.2, at 20.
Since the trial clearly is a critical stage in the criminal prosecution, most
of the cases applying the critical stage test have concerned pretrial pro-
[Vol. 75:425
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2. The Right to Competent Counsel
As in Powell, other Supreme Court cases hinted there was some
sort of counsel competency requirement, although the cases did not
state what standard should be used to determine whether counsel was
competent.28 In 1945, D.C. Circuit Judge Thurman Arnold narrowly
interpreted the standard for ineffective assistance of counsel for fed-
eral defendants, holding that the Due Process Clause was violated
only "where the circumstances surrounding the trial shocked the con-
science of the court and made the proceedings a farce and a mockery ofjustice."29 This "farce and mockery" standard, based on the Due Pro-
cess clause of the Fifth Amendment,o was adopted by all eleven cir-
cuits by 1970,31 when the Supreme Court announced in dicta that "the
right to counsel is the right to effective assistance of counsel."32
After 1970, lower courts began abandoning the "farce and mock-
ery" standard.33 First, the Fifth Circuit interpreted the right to effec-
ceedings. Applying that test, the Supreme Court has held that an 'ac-
cused' has the right to the assistance of counsel at a preliminary hearing,
at some pretrial identification procedures (but not others), and when
subjected to police or prosecutor efforts to elicit inculpatory statements.
Id. (footnotes omitted). See, e.g., Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974)(right to
counsel does not extend to post-conviction discretionary appeals); Hamilton v. Al-
abama, 368 U.S. 52, 55 (1961)(denial of counsel at arraignment in capital case
violates right to counsel).
28. See Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 70 (1942); Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S.
444, 446 (1940); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932).
29. Diggs v. Welch, 148 F.2d 667, 670 (D.C. Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 889
(1945).
30. Id. at 668-69.
31. Trapnell v. United States, 725 F.2d 149, 151 (2d Cir. 1983). See Bottiglio v.
United States, 431 F.2d 930, 931 (1st Cir. 1970)(per curiam); Williams v. Beto,
354 F.2d 698, 704 (5th Cir. 1965); Frand v. United States, 301 F.2d 102, 103 (10th
Cir. 1962); In re Ernst, 294 F.2d 556, 558 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 917
(1961); O'Malley v. United States, 285 F.2d 733, 734 (6th Cir. 1961); Snead v.
Smyth, 273 F.2d 838, 842 (4th Cir. 1959); Cofield v. United States, 263 F.2d 686,
689 (9th Cir.), rev'dper curiam on other grounds, 360 U.S. 472 (1959); Johnston v.
United States, 254 F.2d 239, 240 (8th Cir. 1958); Mitchell v. United States, 259
F.2d 787, 793 (D.C. Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 850 (1958); United States ex
rel. Feeley v. Ragen, 166 F.2d 976, 980-81 (7th Cir. 1948).
In Mitchell, the court noted several reasons for not having a standard that
more closely examined counsel's conduct, including that the whole system of pro-
viding representation to indigent defendants would be destroyed if a standard
examining counsel's conduct was adopted. "No reputable member of the bar
would, nor indeed should, undertake as a public duty the defense of an accused, if
the courts were to permit the client thereafter to institute, by allegations as to
trial tactics, a public inquiry into the professional competence of the lawyer."
Mitchell v. United States, 259 F.2d 787, 793 (D.C. Cir. 1958), cert denied, 358
U.S. 850 (1958).
32. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970). However, the Court did
not define the level of competence required by the Constitution. Id.
33. Trapnell v. United States, 725 F.2d 145, 151 (2d Cir. 1983).
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tive counsel to mean "counsel reasonably likely to render and
rendering reasonably effective assistance."34 Then, the Third Circuit
abandoned the "farce and mockery" standard in favor of a standard of
"normal competency,"35 and the D.C. Circuit soon held that "a defend-
ant is entitled to the reasonably competent assistance of an attorney
acting as his diligent conscientious advocate."36 Other circuit courts 3 7
and some state courts3 8 followed this trend, and in 1983, the Second
Circuit became the last circuit to abandon the "farce and mockery"
standard and adopt the "reasonably competent assistance" standard
for trials in criminal cases. 3 9
An impetus for this change in competency standards was the
Supreme Court's decisions in several cases, including Gideon, which
shifted the focus in right to counsel cases from the "fair trial" Due
Process standard of the Fifth Amendment to the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel and the application of that right to the states through
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.40
In particular, after the Supreme Court decided in Gideon that the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel is of sufficiently fundamental importance to be
binding on the states under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, the Court ... repeatedly referred to some minimal quality of represen-
34. See Caraway v. Beto, 421 F.2d 636, 637 (5th Cir. 1970)(quoting MacKenna v.
Ellis, 280 F.2d 592, 599 (5th Cir. 1960), modified, 289 F.2d 928 (5th Cir. 1961),
cert. denied, 368 U.S. 877 (1961)); MacKenna v. Ellis, 280 F.2d 592, 599 (5th Cir.
1960), modified, 289 F.2d 928 (5th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 877 (1961).
35. Moore v. United States, 432 F.2d 730, 737 (3d Cir. 1970)(en banc).
36. United States v. DeCoster, 487 F.2d 1197, 1202 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
37. See Douglas v. Wainwright, 714 F.2d 1532, 1553 (11th Cir. 1983)("reasonably ef-
fective assistance"), vacated, 468 U.S. 1206 (1984), on remand, 739 F.2d 531 (11th
Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1208 (1985); Dyer v. Crisp, 613 F.2d 275, 278
(10th Cir. 1980)(en banc)("reasonably competent assistance"), cert. denied, 445
U.S. 945 (1980); Cooper v. Fitzharris, 586 F.2d 1325, 1328 (9th Cir. 1978)(en
banc)("reasonably competent and effective" assistance), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 974(1979); United States v. Bosch, 584 F.2d 1113, 1120-21 (1st Cir. 1978)("reason-
ably competent assistance"); Marzullo v. Maryland, 561 F.2d 540, 543-44 (4th
Cir. 1977)("normal competency"), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1011 (1978); United
States v. Easter, 539 F.2d 663, 666 (8th Cir. 1976)("customary skills and dili-
gence" of "a reasonably competent attorney"), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 844 (1977);
United States ex rel. Williams v. Twomey, 510 F.2d 634, 641 (7th Cir. 1975)("min-
imum standard of professional representation"), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 876 (1975);
Beasley v. United States, 491 F.2d 687, 696 (6th Cir. 1974)("reasonably effective
assistance"). See generally Trapnell v. United States, 725 F.2d 149, 151-55 (2d
Cir. 1983)(discussion of development of "reasonably competency" standard).
38. See e.g., State v. Williams, 593 P.2d 896, 901-02 (Ariz. 1979)(en banc); Bruce A.
Green, Note, A Functional Analysis of the Effective Assistance of Counsel, 80
COLUM. L. REv. 1053, 1058-59 (1980).
39. Trapnell v. United States, 725 F.2d 149, 155 (2d Cir. 1983).
40. Id. at 154-55.
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tation in articulating the level of assistance necessary to assure the
constitutional validity of criminal convictions. 41
At least one court stated that the shift to the "reasonably competent
assistance" standard was, in part, a result of efforts to improve the
quality of representation in federal courts.4 2 One court reasoned,
"While a criminal trial is not a game in which the participants are
expected to enter the ring with a near match in skills, neither is it a
sacrifice of unarmed prisoners to gladiators."43 Another judge
summed up the problem of ineffective assistance of counsel by noting
that although disparities of quality of representation are inevitable,
"[wlhat offends the Constitution... is not merely that there are varia-
tions in the quality of representation, but that the burden of less effec-
tive advocacy falls almost exclusively on a single subclass of society-
the poor."44
As state and federal courts adopted the "reasonable competence"
standard, some began to add a requirement that prejudice must have
resulted from the substandard attorney performance in order to find
ineffective assistance of counsel.45 Some courts required defendants
to show varying degrees of prejudice46 and others required that once
the defendant showed attorney incompetence, the state had the bur-
den to prove lack of prejudice. 4 7 However, the disagreements among
41. Id. at 154. See Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 134 (1982)("the Constitution guaran-
tees criminal defendants ... a competent attorney"); Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S.
335, 344 (1980); Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973); McMann v. Rich-
ardson, 397 U.S. 759, 770-71 (1970)(guilty plea may be challenged if trial counsel
did not give defendant advice that was "within the range of competence de-
manded of attorneys in criminal cases").
42. Trapnell v. United States, 725 F.2d 149, 155 (2d Cir. 1983). Still, a study of ap-
proximately 4,000 federal and state reported decisions between 1970 and 1983
addressing ineffective assistance claims showed that only 3.9% resulted in a find-
ing of ineffective assistance of counsel. Richard Klein, The Emperor Gideon Has
No Clothes: The Empty Promise of the Constitutional Right to Effective Assistance
of Counsel, 13 HASTInGs CONST. L.Q. 625, 632 (1986)(footnote omitted). Although
the low number of successful ineffective assistance claims could have been the
result of almost every defendant having competent counsel, at least to some ex-
tent, the low percentage reflects the fact that the ineffective assistance standards
applied by the courts at the time had very little bite.
43. Williams v. Twomey, 510 F.2d 634, 640 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 876
(1975).
44. United States v. DeCoster, 624 F.2d 196, 266 (D.C. Cir. 1979)(Bazelon, J.,
dissenting).
45. Alan W. Clarke, Procedural Labyrinths and the Injustice of Death: A Critique of
Death Penalty Habeas Corpus (Part One), 29 U. RICH. L. REv. 1327, 1353 (1995)
46. Id. at 1353-54. See United States v. Hinton, 631 F.2d 769, 771 (D.C. Cir. 1980);
United States v. Aulet, 618 F.2d 182, 187 (2d Cir. 1980); United States v. Swine-
hart, 617 F.2d 336, 341 (3d Cir. 1980); Knight v. State, 394 So. 2d 997, 1001 (Fla.
1981).
47. Clarke, supra note 45, at 1353-54. See Coles v. Peyton, 389 F.2d 224, 226 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 849 (1968). See also United States v. Hinton, 631
F.2d 769, 771 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
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the lower courts regarding what standard to apply and whether a
showing of prejudice is required would soon be addressed by the
Supreme Court.
B. Strickland v. Washington: The Supreme Court Establishes an
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Standard
In 1984, in Strickland v. Washington,48 the Supreme Court finally
addressed the issue of what standard should be applied to attorney
competency. In Strickland, a defendant sentenced to death claimed
that his attorney was ineffective for failing to seek out character wit-
nesses or to request a psychiatric examination and a presentence
report.49
The Court began its analysis by noting that "[t]he right to counsel
plays a crucial role in the adversarial system embodied in the Sixth
Amendment, since access to counsel's skill and knowledge is necessary
to accord defendants the 'ample opportunity to meet the case of the
prosecution' to which they are entitled."50 In determining the stan-
dard, the Court stated, "The benchmark for judging any claim of inef-
fectiveness must be whether counsel's conduct so undermined the
proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be
relied on as having produced a just result."51 The Court rejected the
categorical approach to ineffective assistance claims52 that some
courts had followed by relying upon a specific set of standards for
counsel's conduct. Instead, it adopted an approach that did not rely
upon specific requirements for counsel.53 The Court set forth the fol-
lowing two-pronged standard:
A convicted defendant's claim that counsel's assistance was so defective as
to require reversal of a conviction or death sentence has two components.
First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient.
This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was
not fimctioning as the "counsel" guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth
Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that the deficient perform-
ance prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that counsel's errors were
48. 466 U.S. 668 (1984). See United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984)(decided the
same day as Strickland).
49. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 675 (1984).
50. Id. at 685 (quoting Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 275-76
(1942)).
51. Id. at 686.
52. See, e.g., United States v. DeCoster, 624 F.2d 196, 275 (D.C. Cir. 1979)(Bazelon,
J., dissenting)("The heart of [the categorical] approach lies in defining ineffective
assistance in terms of the quality of counsel's performance, rather than looking to
the effect of counsel's actions on the outcome of the case.").
53. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688-89 (1984). ("No particular set of
detailed rules for counsel's conduct can satisfactorily take account of the variety
of circumstances faced by defense counsel or the range of legitimate decisions
regarding how best to represent a criminal defendant.").
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so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is
reliable.5 4
The Court noted that more specific guidelines would not work, and
that "the performance inquiry must be whether counsel's assistance
was reasonable considering all the circumstances."'5 Applying this
test, the Court found no ineffective assistance of counsel in Strickland
because the defendant failed to show either unreasonably deficient
performance or prejudice.56
The Court stressed that the evaluation of counsel's performance
must be very deferential and should give a "strong presumption that
counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable profes-
sional assistance... ."57 As for the prejudice requirement, the Court
did note that in certain contexts, prejudice is presumed. Specifically,
the Court stated that "actual or constructive denial of the assistance of
counsel altogether is legally presumed to result in prejudice. So are
various kinds of state interference with counsel's assistance."58 The
Court allowed a presumption in those situations because prejudice in
those cases is so likely that case-by-case analysis is not worth the ef-
fort, and because such situations involve Sixth Amendment violations
that are easy to identify and for the government to correct.5 9 In fact,
the Court characterized Powell as an ineffective assistance of counsel
54. Id. at 687. The Court noted this test was not significantly different from the "rea-
sonable competence" standard applied by the lower courts, and thus, defendants'
claims evaluated under the old standard did not need to be reconsidered. Id. at
696-97.
The same standards for reviewing ineffective assistance claims apply whether
counsel is retained or appointed. Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 344-45
(1980)("Since the State's conduct of a criminal trial itself implicates the State in
the defendant's conviction, we see no basis for drawing a distinction between re-
tained and appointed counsel that would deny equal justice to defendants who
must choose their own lawyers.").
55. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984). The Court did note that rep-
resentation of a criminal defendant involves some basic duties, including, but not
limited to, a duty of loyalty, a duty to avoid conflicts of interest, a duty to advo-
cate the defendant's case, a duty to consult with the defendant on important deci-
sions, a duty to keep the defendant informed of important developments, and "a
duty to bring to bear such skill and knowledge as will render the trial a reliable
adversarial testing process." Id. (citations omitted).
56. Id. at 700.
57. Id. at 689. The Court reasoned there are several ways to effectively try a case
and the Court should not judge the attorney's performance in hindsight. Id. Fur-
ther, the Court reasoned that an intrusive scrutiny of a counsel's decisions would
discourage counsel from accepting cases and would interfere with the trust be-
tween attorney and client. Id. at 690.
58. Id. at 692 (citing United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659 n.25 (1984)).
59. Id.
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case where prejudice was presumed because of the circumstances sur-
rounding that case. 60
The Court noted that there is a "limited" presumption of prejudice
where defense counsel is operating under a conflict of interest. In
those cases, "[pirejudice is presumed only if the defendant demon-
strates that counsel 'actively represented conflicting interests' and
that 'an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer's per-
formance." 61 In several earlier cases, the Court had found constitu-
tional error without any showing of prejudice when counsel was either
totally absent or was prevented from assisting the accused during a
critical stage of the proceedings.62
Absent a presumption of prejudice, a defendant must prove preju-
dice, which is more than the fact that the errors had a conceivable
effect on the outcome of the proceeding.63 However, the defendant
need not show that counsel's deficient conduct more likely than not
altered the outcome of the case.6 4 The Court explained that the test
for prejudice is that "[t]he defendant must show that there is a reason-
60. United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 660-61 (1984). In Cronic, the Court de-
clined to presume prejudice where newly appointed counsel, a real estate attor-
ney in his first jury trial, was given little time to prepare. Id. at 666-67. As one
commentator noted about Powell, "In the important search for guidance on the
distinction between presence of counsel and performance of counsel, Powell is
somewhat ambiguous." William S. Geimer, A Decade of Strickland's Tin Horn:
Doctrinal and Practical Undermining of the Right to Counsel, 4 WM. & MARY BnL
RTS. J. 91, 98 (1995).
61. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 692 (1984)(quoting Cuyler v. Sullivan,
446 U.S. 335, 348-50 (1980)(footnote omitted).
62. See, e.g., Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80 (1976)(finding a Sixth Amendment
violation without a showing of prejudice where the defendant was denied access
to counsel during a 17-hour recess during trial); Herring v. New York, 422 U.S.
853 (1975)(finding Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment violations where state stat-
ute gave judge the power to deny counsel the opportunity to make summation of
the evidence); Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605, 612-13 (1972)(holding that
state statute requiring defendant who desires to testify to do so before any other
testimony for the defense is presented infringes upon right to counsel); White v.
Maryland, 373 U.S. 59, 60 (1963)(per curiam)(holding that lack of counsel at pre-
liminary hearing, at which defendant entered a guilty plea that was used as evi-
dence at trial, required reversal of conviction); Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52,
55 (1961)(holding that denial of counsel at arraignment required reversal of con-
viction, even though no prejudice was shown); Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570
(1961)(holding that it violates due process to deny a defendant the right to have
counsel question him to elicit his statement).
63. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 693 (1984). In dissent, Justice Marshall
argued that the abridgment of the right to effective assistance of counsel is the
same as the abridgment of the right to counsel, which can never be treated as
harmless error. Therefore, Marshall concluded that a showing that the perform-
ance of defense counsel was below constitutionally prescribed standards requires
a new trial regardless of whether the defendant suffered demonstrable prejudice.
Id. at 711-12 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
64. Id. at 693-94.
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able probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the re-
sult of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable
probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the
outcome."65
An overriding element of Strickland's two-prong test is the ques-
tion of whether the defendant received a fair trial.66 In a recent case,
the Court emphasized Strickland's holding that the test for prejudice
does not require proof that an attorney's deficient performance was
outcome determinative. In Lockhart v. Fretwell,67 the Court held that
the failure of a defendant's counsel to make a trial objection to the use
of an aggravating factor in a death penalty case, which would have
been sustained under the law at the time, was not "prejudicial."6s The
case that would have supported the trial objection was overruled after
the trial,69 so unreliability and unfairness did not result because the
alleged ineffectiveness did not deprive the defendant of any substan-
tive or procedural right to which the law entitled him.70 In Fretwell,
the Court stated that a prejudice "analysis focusing solely on mere
outcome determination, without attention to whether the result of the
proceeding was fundamentally unfair or unreliable, is defective.73
65. Id. at 694. This prejudice standard comes from the test for materiality of excul-
patory information withheld by the prosecution from the defense and the test for
materiality of testimony made unavailable to the defense by Government depor-
tation of a witness. Id. See United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858,
872-74 (1982); United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 112-13 (1976). In determin-
ing what standard to use, the Court rejected an outcome-determinative standard
used for assessing motions for new trial based on newly discovered evidence. The
Court reasoned that such a standard would have been more difficult for defense
counsel to satisfy and should not apply where, as in the ineffective assistance of
counsel context, the trial was possibly unfair. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668, 694 (1984).
66. "Absent some effect of challenged conduct on the reliability of the trial process,
the Sixth Amendment guarantee is generally not implicated." United States v.
Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 658 (1984).
67. 506 U.S. 364 (1993).
68. Id. at 372.
69. Collins v. Lockhart, 754 F.2d 258 (8th Cir. 1985)(prohibiting use of aggravating
factors that duplicate elements of underlying charge), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1013
(1985), overruled by Perry v. Lockhart, 871 F.2d 1384 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied,
493 U.S. 959 (1989). See Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231 (1988).
70. Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 367 (1993). See Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S.
157, 175 (1986)(failure to assist in the presentation of perjured testimony could
not constitute prejudicial error).
71. Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 369 (1993). But see Gilbert v. California, 388
U.S. 263, 279 (1967)(Black, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part):
I think it far safer for constitutional rights for this Court to adhere to
constitutional language like 'the accused shall ... have the Assistance of
Counsel for his defence' instead of substituting the words not mentioned,
'the accused shall have the assistance of counsel only if the Supreme
Court thinks it necessary to assure a fair trial.'
1996]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
Therefore, under Supreme Court precedent, the focus of an ineffec-
tiveness claim is a deferential standard of whether the trial was relia-
ble and fair. In evaluating the fairness of the trial, courts are to look
at whether the counsel's performance was deficient, whether the trial
was unfair, and whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the out-
come would have been different had counsel's performance not been
deficient. Further, in making the deficiency determination, courts de-
fer to an attorney's trial strategy decisions. Regarding prejudice,
there are some situations where prejudice will be presumed.
The Strickland test has been criticized for many reasons. 72 Justice
Blackmun recently noted, "Ten years after the articulation of that
standard, practical experience establishes that the Strickland test, in
application, has failed to protect a defendant's right to be represented
by something more than 'a person who happens to be a lawyer."7s
Strickland created an "almost insurmountable hurdle for defendants
claiming ineffective assistance."74 Commentators have noted that
although the Court stressed the importance of the Sixth Amendment
72. The Supreme Court shares a major responsibility for the shameful qual-
ity of counsel that is tolerated in the nation's courts. Chief Justice War-
ren Burger was going around the country talking about how trial
lawyers were incompetent at the very same time that the Court he pre-
sided over was adopting a standard that amounts to nothing more than
'close enough for government work' in Strickland v. Washington.
Stephen B. Bright, The Politics of Crime and the Death Penalty: Not "Soft on
Crime," But Hard on the Bill of Rights, 39 ST. Louis U. L.J. 479, 498 (1995).
73. McFarland v. Scott, 114 S. Ct. 2785, 2787 (1994)(Blackmun, J., dissenting). See
Mark Ballard & Richard Connelly, Gideon's Broken Promise, Tax. LAWYER, Aug.
28, 1995.
74. Martin C. Calhoun, Note, How to Thread the Needle: Toward A Checklist-Based
Standard for Evaluating Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims, 77 GEo. L.J.
413, 427 (1988). See Hon. David L. Bazelon, The Defective Assistance of Counsel,
42 U. Cne. L. REv. 1 (1973)(arguing that defendant should not have to show preju-
dice); Stephen B. Bright, Death by Lottery-Procedural Bar of Constitutional
Claims in Capital Cases Due to Inadequate Representation of Indigent Defend-
ants, 92 W. VA. L. REv. 679 (1990)(noting that Strickland, along with procedural
default cases, has created a substandard level of representation for the poor and
the arbitrary infliction of the death penalty); Alan W. Clarke, supra note 45, at
1352 ("After Strickland, the courts will rarely, if ever, seriously review cases of
substandard lawyering-even in capital cases."); William S. Geimer, supra note
60, at 138-47 (arguing that Strickland prejudice prong effectively has resulted in
the deincorporation of the right to effective assistance of counsel); Gary Good-
paster, The Adversary System, Advocacy, and Effective Assistance of Counsel in
Criminal Cases, 14 N.Y.U. REv. L. Soc. CHANGE 59, 67 (1986)(Strickland and
Cronic appear to be "designed to help reviewing courts deal efficiently with these
claims rather than seriously address the potential injustice problems caused by
incompetent trial counsel."); Richard L. Gabriel, Note, The Strickland Standard
for Claims of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel: Emasculating the Sixth Amend-
ment in the Guise of Due Process, 134 U. PA. L. Rav. 1259, 1276-86 (1986)(arguing
that Strickland prejudice requirement undermines purposes of the Sixth Amend-
ment). See also Note, The Eighth Amendment and Ineffective Assistance of Coun-
sel in Capital Trials, 107 HARv. L. REv. 1923, 1931, 1935-36 (1994)(arguing that
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right to effective assistance of counsel, the strong deference given to a
trial counsel's performance indicates the Court's great concern for ju-
dicial economy and attorneys' reputations.75 Further, the prejudice
test adopted by the Court in Strickland placed substantial emphasis
on whether the defendant was factually culpable and insufficient em-
phasis on whether the defendant received a fair trial and was legally
guilty. 76 As one critic observed, "the Sixth Amendment right to effec-
tive assistance of counsel exists mainly to aid the factually innocent
defendant convince the jury or judge of his legal innocence."77 For
the Strickland prejudice prong should not apply in death penalty cases because it
is so diffcult to prove).
An overall critique of the Strickland standard is beyond the scope of this Arti-
cle. For purposes of this Article, the author assumes that the Supreme Court will
not overrule Strickland in the near future and examines the sleeping and im-
paired attorney scenario within the Strickland framework established by the
Supreme Court. However, for purposes of applying the established framework to
the sleeping and impaired attorney situation, one needs to be aware of the
problems with the Strickland standard.
75. Calhoun, supra note 74, at 427.
Trial judges (particularly in small rural jurisdictions where all bar mem-
bers and judges know each other intimately) may well be reluctant to
criticize trial counsel's performance. Strickland invites the court to take
the path of least resistance-to simply find that even if errors occurred,
those errors did not prejudice the defendant.
Clarke, supra note 45, at 1357. See Bazelon, supra note 74, at 25. Judge David
Bazelon, former Chief Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia, noted the reluctance of judges to "soil the reputations" of ap-
pointed counsel by finding them ineffective. Id.
76. Calhoun, supra note 74, at 428-29. Judge Bazelon called this reasoning the
"guilty anyway syndrome:"
The final reason why judges are reluctant to reverse convictions on
grounds of inadequate assistance... is the belief., that most criminal
defendants are guilty anyway. From this assumption it is a short path
to the conclusion that the quality of representation is of small account.
This may be an important reason why appellate courts commonly re-
quire appellants to show not only that their constitutional right to effec-
tive counsel was denied but also that the denial was prejudicial.
Id. at 426.
77. Calhoun, supra, note 74, at 428-29. See William J. Genego, The Future of Effec-
tive Assistance of Counsel: Performance Standards and Competent Representa-
tion, 22 Am. CRmi. L. Rav. 181, 199 (1984). Another commentator has stated that
for a defendant to succeed on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim after
Strickland and Fretwell, "[Tlhe petitioner must have had truly abysmal lawyer-
ing, and since the court seems to equate fairness of the trial with innocence, the
defendant must prove innocence in at least some sense (including the odd concept
of innocence of the death penalty) before relief will be forthcoming." Clarke,
supra note 45, at 1362. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 711
(1984)(Marshall, J., dissenting):
[Tihe assumption on which the Coures holding rests is that the only pur-
pose of the constitutional guarantee of effective assistance of counsel is
to reduce the chance that innocent persons will be convicted. In my
view, the guarantee also functions to ensure that convictions are ob-
tained only through fundamentally fair procedures.
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some of these reasons, at least one state court has refused to use the
Strickland test's prejudice requirement under that state's
constitution. 78
III. CASES WHERE COURTS DO NOT REQUIRE A SHOWING
OF PREJUDICE IN FINDING INEFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
In several Sixth Amendment right to counsel cases, courts have not
required a showing of prejudice by the defendant.79 These cases make
78. State courts in Hawaii apply a different two-part test: "1) that there were specific
errors or omissions reflecting counsel's lack of skill, judgment, or diligence; and 2)
that such errors or omissions resulted in either the withdrawal or substantial
impairment of a potentially meritorious defense." State v. Aplaca, 837 P.2d 1298,
1305 (Haw. 1992). The Hawaii test gives greater protection to a defendant's right
to effective assistance of counsel than the Strickland test does. Id. at 1305 n.2.
See Briones v. State, 848 P.2d 966, 977 (Haw. 1993)("Accordingly, no showing of
'actual' prejudice is required to prove ineffective assistance of counsel."); State v.
Smith, 712 P.2d 496, 500 n.7 (Haw. 1986)("The Strickland test has been criticized
as being unduly difficult for a defendant to meet .... The test for measuring
ineffectiveness adopted by this court ... is not that declared by the Supreme
Court .... ); State v. Antone, 615 P.2d 101, 104-05 (Haw. 1980).
79. A requirement of showing prejudice is distinguishable from harmless error analy-
sis. For the most part, the discussion in this section and in this Article focuses on
the prejudice requirement.
Harmless error analysis applies to many constitutional violations. In Chap-
man v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967), the Supreme Court held that if the prose-
cution can prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a constitutional error did not
contribute to the verdict, the error is harmless and the verdict stands. Id. at 24.
The Strickland prejudice requirement, as discussed above, applies to ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel claims and requires that the defendant show that the
attorney's conduct prejudiced the defendant. Arguably, when the Strickland test
is applied, courts should not apply harmless error analysis because the test incor-
porates the harmlessness standard into the prejudice requirement. See Linda E.
Carter, Harmless Error in the Penalty Phase of a Capital Case: A Doctrine Misun-
derstood and Misapplied, 28 GA. L. REv. 125, 129 n.26 (1993). Chapman also
noted that certain constitutional errors, including a deprivation of counsel, can
never amount to harmless error. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 n.8
(1967). See Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 294 (1991)(denial of counsel at
trial or preliminary hearing "can never be harmless error")(White J., dissenting);
Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 88-89 (1988)(actions of counsel effectively leaving
defendant without appellate representation can never be harmless error).
There are, however, cases in the context of absence of counsel where the de-
fendant did not have to show prejudice, but the court still did a harmless error
analysis. See, e.g., Sanders v. Lane, 861 F.2d 1033, 1038 (7th Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, 489 U.S. 1057 (1989); Siverson v. O'Leary, 764 F.2d 1208, 1217 (7th Cir.
1985)(applying harmless error analysis where attorney voluntarily left courtroom
during a critical stage of the trial). However, the more logical analysis in most
cases where a de facto deprivation of counsel occurred is that a defendant should
not be required to show prejudice and the court should not do a harmless error
analysis. See United States ex rel. Thomas v. O'Leary, 856 F.2d 1011, 1017-19
(7th Cir. 1988); Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 489-91 (1978)(not applying
harmless error analysis where the attorney had a conflict of interest); Geders v.
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up several categories: (1) cases where the defendant had no counsel or
outside circumstances effectively prevented a defendant from having
counsel; (2) cases where counsel was not admitted to the bar; (3) cases
where counsers performance or behavior was extremely egregious;
and (4) cases where counsel had a conflict of interest.80 Cases involv-
ing impaired or sleeping counsel are discussed in the next section.
The cases that do not require a showing of prejudice form a continuum
from actual deprivation of counsel to effective deprivation of counsel.S1
The reasoning in these cases derives from Strickland, where the Court
noted that "[a]ctual or constructive denial of the assistance of counsel
altogether is legally presumed to result in prejudice."82
United States, 425 U.S. 80 (1976)(not applying harmless error analysis where
defendant was denied access to counsel during a 17-hour recess). Cf Rushen v.
Spain, 464 U.S. 114 (1983)(per curiam)(where trial judge had an improper ex
parte communication with a juror, the defendants right to counsel is subject to
harmless error analysis unless the deprivation, by its very nature, cannot be
harmless).
Finally, some commentators have suggested that instead of having the preju-
dice requirement of Strickland, with the burden on the defendant to show preju-
dice, the Court should have applied the standard harmless error analysis, with
the burden on the State. Geimer, supra note 60, at 131-38. See Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 711-12 (1984)(Marshall, J., dissenting).
80. Another category of ineffective assistance of counsel cases is where the govern-
ment interferes with counsel's representation of a defendant, such as the situa-
tion where an undercover government agent participates in meetings between
defense counsel and the defendant. See Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545
(1977)(holding that there was no per se Sixth Amendment violation where the
agent's purpose was to maintain undercover status and not to spy). The focus in
these cases is whether or not the defendant must show that the government
gained an advantage from the intrusion. Lower courts are split on this issue.
Compare United States v. Hernandez, 937 F.2d 1490, 1494 (9th Cir. 1991)(hold-
ing that the government did not violate the defendant's Sixth Amendment rights
because the defendant was unable to show prejudice from the fact that an under-
cover government informant attended meetings between the defendant and coun-
sel) with Shillinger v. Haworth, 70 F.3d 1132 (10th Cir. 1995)(holding that where
government purposefully intrudes into the attorney-client relationship and confi-
dential information is transmitted to the government, prejudice is presumed)
with United States v. Mastroianni, 749 F.2d 900 (1st Cir. 1984)(applying rule
that defendant must show confidential information was transmitted to the gov-
ernment and then the government has the burden to rebut the presumption of
prejudice).
81. There are no clear lines between the different types of per se prejudice cases as
they all involve a deprivation of counsel at some level and the seriousness of the
"deprivations" is subject to varying interpretations. Some of the cases discussed
may fit into more than one of the categories listed. Thus, although the article
breaks the cases into categories, it is important to remember that the cases make
up a continuum more than isolated categories.
82. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 688, 692 (1984).
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A. Deprivation of Counsel by the Court
Both before and after the Court's decision in Strickland, the Court
has "found constitutional error without any showing of prejudice when
counsel was either totally absent,8 3 or was prevented from assisting
the accused during a critical stage of the proceedings."84 In Chapman
83. United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659 (1984). See, e.g., White v. Maryland,
373 U.S. 59, 60 (1963)(per curiam)(holding that lack of counsel at a preliminary
hearing where the defendant pleaded guilty violated right to counsel without a
showing of prejudice); Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 55 (1961)(holding that
denial of counsel at arraignment in capital case violates right to counsel without
a showing of prejudice). See also United States v. Taylor, 933 F.2d 307, 313 (5th
Cir. 1991)(holding that a denial of a defendant's request to withdraw his waiver
of counsel and to have standby counsel at sentencing phase of trial was prejudi-
cial per se), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 883 (1991); Siverson v. O'Leary, 764 F.2d 1208,
1217 (7th Cir. 1985)(holding that the defendant does not have to make showing
under Strickland prejudice prong where counsel was absent during jury delibera-
tions and the return of the verdict. Harmless error analysis applies in this situa-
tion, but may not apply if absence is at some critical stages); Golden v. Newsome,
755 F.2d 1478, 1483 (11th Cir. 1985)(holding that the Sixth Amendment was vio-
lated where counsel absent from sentencing because "the total denial of counsel
at a critical stage such as sentencing is presumptively prejudicial and is not to be
deemed harmless error"); Wilson v. Mintzes, 761 F.2d 275, 286 (6th Cir.
1985)(holding that defendant improperly deprived of counsel of his choice does
not have to show prejudice and that harmless error analysis is inapplicable); Mc-
Knight v. South Carolina, 465 S.E.2d 352, 354 (S.C. 1995)(finding Sixth Amend-
ment violation where counsel was absent during testimony of the victim and
holding "that when counsel is denied at a critical stage of a defendant's trial,
prejudice will be presumed and harmless error analysis is precluded"). See gener-
ally United States v. Ellison, 798 F.2d 1102, 1107 (7th Cir. 1986)(finding ineffec-
tive assistance and presuming prejudice where defense counsel testified against
the defendant at a hearing on a motion to withdraw plea because the defendant
was effectively without the assistance of counsel).
84. United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659 (1984). See, e.g., Penson v. Ohio, 488
U.S. 75 (1988)(holding that Strickland prejudice requirement and harmless error
analysis do not apply where defendant was denied appointment of counsel on
appeal); Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 626 (1986)(holding that Sixth
Amendment is violated where defendants requested counsel during arraignments
but were not given an opportunity to consult with counsel before police initiated
further interrogations); Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80, 91 (1976)(finding
Sixth Amendment violation without a showing of prejudice where defendant was
denied access to counsel during a 17-hour overnight recess during trial); Herring
v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 863-65 (1975)(finding Sixth and Fourteenth Amend-
ment violation where state statute gave the judge power to deny counsel the op-
portunity to make a summation of the evidence); Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S.
605, 612-13 (1972)(holding that state statute requiring a defendant who desires
to testify to do so before any other testimony for the defense is presented in-
fringes upon right to counsel); Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570, 596
(1961)(holding that it violates due process to deny a defendant the right to have
counsel question him to elicit his statement). See also United States v. Salemo,
61 F.3d 214, 221-22 (3d Cir. 1995)(holding that harmless error analysis is inap-
propriate where trial court failed to make proper inquiry of a defendant regard-
ing waiver of counsel at sentencing hearing); Robinson v. Norris, 60 F.3d 457,460
(8th Cir. 1995)(holding that prejudice presumed and defendant was denied right
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v. California,8 5 while fashioning a constitutional harmless error rule,
the Court noted that some constitutional rights are so basic that "their
infraction can never be treated as harmless error."86 Among those
rights, the Court noted, is the right to counsel.87 Thus, in cases where
a defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim is based on the
argument that the defendant was denied representation or access to
counsel, the Supreme Court and the lower courts generally hold that
no showing of prejudice is required. Sometimes, as in Powell, sur-
rounding circumstances are such that, although counsel is available to
assist the defendant, "the likelihood that any lawyer, even a fully com-
petent one, could provide effective assistance is so small that a pre-
sumption of prejudice is appropriate without inquiry into the actual
conduct of the trial."88
to effective assistance of counsel when the state court informed him he could file a
pro se petition for a new trial); United States v. Allen, 895 F.2d 1577, 1580 (10th
Cir. 1990)(where state court accepted an invalid waiver of counsel, Strickland's
prejudice requirement and Chapman's harmless error analysis are inapplicable);
Mudd v. United States, 798 F.2d 1509, 1512-13 (D.C. Cir. 1986)(holding that or-
der denying a criminal defendant the right to consult with counsel during week-
end recess about defendant's testimony violated the Sixth Amendment right to
effective assistance without showing of actual prejudice and without harmless
error analysis). Cf. Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1970)(remanding for
determination of whether denial of counsel at preliminary hearing was harmless
error).
85. 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
86. Id. at 23.
87. Id. at 23 n.8 (citing Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963)). See United
States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659 (1984)(The presumption that counsel's assist-
ance is essential requires us to conclude that a trial is unfair if the accused is
denied counsel at a critical stage of his trial."); Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668, 692 (1984)("denial of the assistance of counsel altogether is legally pre-
sumed to result in prejudice"). See also Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U.S. 249, 256
(1988).
88. United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659-60 (1984)(citing Powell v. Alabama,
287 U.S. 45 (1932)). See Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 857-58 (1975)(state
statute allowing judges in criminal bench trials to deny defense attorneys the
chance to deliver closing arguments violates the constitution). Thus, it is possible
that a showing of prejudice would be unnecessary if counsel were given inade-
quate time to prepare for trial. See Kimball v. State, 468 N.E.2d 242 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1984)(failure to provide adequate opportunity for preparation should be
treated as a denial of right to counsel), reversed, 474 N.E.2d 982 (Ind. 1985)(re-
versing Court of Appeals conclusion that counsel was not given adequate time
and not addressing whether prejudice needed to be shown); City of Seattle v. Rat-
liff, 667 P.2d 630 (Wash. 1983)(en banc)(holding that petitioner's right to counsel
was denied where a law student was prevented from complying with require-
ments of the limited practice rule in that the student was prevented from contact-
ing his supervisor prior to trial); State v. Maher, 290 S.E.2d 694 (N.C.
1982)(holding that with trial court's denial of defendant's motion to continue
where attorney had inadequate time to prepare for trial, prejudice is presumed
and burden is on the state to show harmless error). See also Walberg v. Israel,
766 F.2d 1071, 1075-76 (7th Cir. 1985)(holding that prejudice does not need to be
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In Penson v. Ohio,89 appellate90 counsel was granted leave to with-
draw from representing a criminal defendant without filing a proper
Anders9l brief. The United States Supreme Court held that because
of the denial of counsel, a Strickland prejudice requirement was inap-
propriate.92 Similarly, in Geders v. United States,93 the Court did not
require a showing of prejudice to find a Sixth Amendment violation
where a defendant was denied access to counsel during a 17-hour
overnight recess during trial. Lower courts have found Sixth Amend-
ment violations without a showing of prejudice or without a harmless
error analysis where counsel has been absent during critical stages of
the trial.94
shown where trial judge implied that counsel's future appointments would be
jeopardized if he pressed too hard during trial), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1013 (1985);
State v. Peart, 621 So. 2d 780, 791 (La. 1993)(finding rebuttable presumption of
ineffective assistance of counsel because state did not supply adequate resources
for representing indigent defendants).
89. 488 U.S. 75 (1988).
90. There is a right to effective assistance of counsel on a criminal defendant's first
appeal as of right. Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 397 (1985). See generally, Lissa
Griffin, The Right to Effective Assistance of Appellate Counsel, 97 W. VA. L. REv. 1
(1994)(arguing that Strickland prejudice requirement should not apply to claims
of appellate ineffectiveness).
91. Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967)(setting forth procedures for allowing
appointed counsel for an indigent defendant to withdraw from a first appeal as of
right on the grounds that the appeal was frivolous).
92. Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 88-89 (1988). See Garland v. Cox, 472 F.2d 875, 879
(4th Cir. 1973)(where defendant shows late appointment of counsel, court
presumes ineffective assistance of counsel), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 908 (1973).
93. 425 U.S. 80, 91 (1976). Cf Perry v. Leeke, 488 U.S. 272 (1989)(an order prohibit-
ing defendant from consulting with counsel during a 15-minute recess while de-
fendant was testifying did not violate constitution). See generally, Timothy J.
McAuley, Note, An Accused's Right to Counsel During a Trial Recess, 12 U.
BRIDGEPORT L. REV. 97 (1991)(discussing cases involving denial of right to coun-
sel during trial recess).
94. Green v. Arn, 809 F.2d 1257, 1263 (6th Cir. 1987)(quoting Siverson v. O'Leary,
764 F.2d 1208, 1217-18 n.6 (7th Cir. 1985)) vacated on other grounds, 484 U.S.
806 (1987), reinstated, 839 F.2d 300 (1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1034
(1989)("The absence of counsel during the taking of evidence on the defendant's
guilt is prejudicial per se and justifies an automatic grant of the writ 'without any
opportunity for a harmless error inquiry.-). In Green, the court stressed that
counsel was absent during a "critical" stage of the proceedings, noting that a
harmless error analysis would be appropriate if it were a non-critical stage.
Green v. Arn, 809 F.2d 1257, 1263 (6th Cir. 1987). See Takacs v. Engle, 768 F.2d
122, 124 (6th Cir. 1985)(harmless error analysis used to consider the constitu-
tional effect of the denial of counsel at a preliminary hearing).
One court summed up the definition of "critical stage" for purposes of the
Sixth Amendment:
A critical stage is one where potential substantial prejudice to de-
fendant's rights inheres in the particular confrontation and where coun-
sel's abilities can help avoid that prejudice. [Coleman v. Alabama, 399
U.S. 1, 9 (1970).] Such confrontations include, for example, the indict-
ment, arraignment and preliminary hearing, [Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S.
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The rationale for not requiring a showing of prejudice and for not
subjecting these claims to harmless error analysis is similar in all of
these cases. At some point, it can be assumed that the defendants in
these cases were, either in actuality or in effect, without counsel. In
these cases, there were no attorneys to ensure that the "adversarial
testing process" 9 5 was working, and therefore, a fair trial could no
longer be presumed. Thus, prejudice should not be required at the
point where the adversary process becomes unreliable and the defend-
ant becomes "unable to subject the government's case against him to
'the crucible of meaningful adversarial testing-the essence of the
right to effective assistance of counsel."96 As one court noted, "there is
a great difference between having a bad lawyer and having no law-
yer. . . ."97 Of course, the most extreme example of the deprivation
situation is where defendant is actually without counsel.
The other categories of cases where courts have found per se preju-
dice are actually subsets of the deprivation of counsel cases. In effect,
they are situations where, while there may not have been an actual
denial of access to counsel, the defendants were, in effect, not repre-
sented by counsel. Such findings are consistent with Strickland's dec-
laration that the "[actual or constructive denial of the assistance of
counsel altogether is legally presumed to result in prejudice."9 8
B. Counsel Not Admitted to the Bar
Several courts have found per se prejudice in the situation where a
criminal defendant's counsel was not licensed to practice law. In
United States v. Novak,99 the United States Court of Appeals for the
682, 689 (1972)], and sentencing. [Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668, 686 (1984).]
United States ex rel. Thomas v. O'Leary, 856 F.2d 1011, 1014 (7th Cir. 1988).
95. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690 (1984).
96. Martin v. Rose, 744 F.2d 1245, 1250 (6th Cir. 1984)(quoting United States v.
Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 656 (1984)).
97. United States v. Taylor, 933 F.2d 307, 312 (5th Cir. 1991)(citing Woodard v. Col-
lins, 898 F.2d 1027, 1028 (5th Cir. 1990))(holding that a denial of a defendant's
request to withdraw his waiver of counsel and to have standby counsel at sen-
tencing phase of trial was prejudicial per se), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 883 (1991).
98. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 692 (1984)(emphasis added).
99. 903 F.2d 883 (2d Cir. 1990). See Solina v. United States, 709 F.2d 160 (2d Cir.
1983)(pre-Strickland case holding that per se prejudice rule applies where re-
tained counsel was not licensed to practice law). See also In re Johnson, 822 P.2d
1317 (Cal. 1992)(en banc)(without examining quality of representation, the court
held that where defendant's trial attorney had been suspended from the practice
of law for conviction of child molestation and had resigned from the State Bar,
defendant was denied right to counsel); State v. Newcome, 577 N.E.2d 125, 126
(Ohio App. 1989)(finding Sixth Amendment violation and requiring reversal
where counsel, who represented defendant at time of guilty plea, was suspended
from the practice of law); People v. Felder, 391 N.E.2d 1274, 1277 (N.Y.
1979)(holding that harmless error analysis should not apply where defendants
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Second Circuit applied a per se prejudice standard when a criminal
defendant was represented by a person who had obtained admission to
the bar through fraudulent means and who was subsequently dis-
barred. Because counsel had not met the state's substantive require-
ments for admission to the New York State Bar, the court reasoned
there was no foundation for an assumption that the attorney had the
legal skills to be admitted properly to the bar.100
The courts' reasoning in flndingper se prejudice in the above situa-
tion is similar to the reasoning for finding per se prejudice in situa-
tions where a defendant was denied representation. In cases where
"counsel" has not met the substantive requirements for bar admission,
the defendant was, in effect, without counsel. Thus, these cases are
actually an extension of the requirement that criminal defendants
have an attorney, and where the assistance of counsel has been de-
nied, the error can never be harmless.O1
C. Counsel's Behavior or Performance Egregious
Traveling a little further down the continuum from no actual coun-
sel to effective counsel, courts have found that when counsel's conduct
is especially egregious, no showing of prejudice needs to be made. On
the same day Strickland was decided, the Court noted in United
States v. Cronic, "[I]f counsel entirely fails to subject the prosecution's
case to meaningful adversarial testing, then there has been a denial of
Sixth Amendment rights that makes the adversary process itself pre-
were represented by a person who was not a lawyer and did not satisfy the pre-
requisites for bar admission); Hucklebury v. State, 337 So. 2d 400, 403 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1976)(defendant's conviction vacated when represented by a person who
passed bar exam, but was refused admission because he did not meet the moral
standards for admission). Cf People v. Barillas, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 418 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1996)(defendant not denied right to counsel when defendant's attorney sus-
pended during trial for commingling client funds with his own money); People v.
Pubrat, 548 N.W.2d 595, 598 (Mich. 1996)(holding that attorney was not per se
ineffective when he was suspended during the trial).
100. United States v. Novak, 903 F.2d 883, 890 (2d Cir. 1990). The court stressed,
however, that mere technical flaws in an attorney's bar license or suspension for
technical reasons like failure to pay bar dues did not deprive a defendant of the
assistance to counsel. Id. at 888. See People v. Tin Trung Ngo, 924 P.2d 97, 98
(Calif. 1996)(holding that it was not ineffective assistance of counsel when the
attorney had been placed on inactive status by the bar for not keeping up with
bar's continuing legal education requirements); Cantu v. Texas, 930 S.W.2d 594,
602-03 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996)(not automatic ineffective assistance of counsel
when defense attorney was suspended for failure to respond to state bar inquiries
before trial). Cf People v. Pubrat, 548 N.W.2d 595, 599 (Mich. 1996)(rejecting
distinction between administrative and substantive suspensions and holding that
either type of suspension does not always implicate an attorney's fitness to prac-
tice law).
101. See United States v. Novak, 903 F.2d 883, 886 (2d Cir. 1990); Chapman v. Cali-
fornia, 386 U.S. 18, 23 (1967).
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sumptively unreliable."1o 2 The most extreme examples of where
courts have found per se prejudice because of the especially poor con-
duct of counsel are cases where counsel was present at trial but re-
fused to participate,30 3 and cases where counsel failed to file an
appeal.1o4 In such cases, defendants are, in effect, without counsel.
102. United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659 (1984).
103. See Tucker v. Day, 969 F.2d 155, 159 (5th Cir. 1992)(prejudice is presumed where
the attorney merely "stood in" during defendant's sentencing); Harding v. Davis,
878 F.2d 1341, 1345 (11th Cir. 1989)(court presumed prejudice when defense
counsel in a state criminal proceeding remained silent through most of trial and
did not object when the court directed a verdict against the defendant); Martin v.
Rose, 744 F.2d 1245, 1250-51 (6th Cir. 1984)(counsel refused to participate at
trial because he thought participation would waive pretrial motions or make
their denial harmless error, court found ineffective assistance of counsel without
any showing of prejudice); Reyes-Vasquez v. United States, 865 F. Supp. 1539,
1548 (S.D. Fla. 1994)(holding that prejudice was presumed when counsel did not
participate in trial because he believed that an appeal of his pretrial motions
would be successful); Gardiner v. United States, 679 F. Supp. 1143, 1147 (D.
Maine 1988)(holding that actual prejudice was presumed when trial counsel
failed to aid defendant in any manner with respect to sentencing); State v. Har-
vey, 692 S.W.2d 290,292 (Mo. 1985)(en banc)(court found ineffective assistance of
counsel without a prejudice showing when defense counsel attended but did not
participate in a capital murder trial); State v. Lamoreaux, 525 P.2d 303, 306
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1974)(court found ineffective assistance and that harmless error
analysis does not apply when a privately retained attorney, who was present in
court, refused to participate in the proceedings). Cf Warner v. Ford, 752 F.2d
622, 623 (11th Cir. 1985)(holding that attorney's lack of participation was trial
strategy, and, therefore, a prejudice presumption did not apply).
As one court explained using baseball analogies:
Every criminal defendant is entitled to have his lawyer step up to the
plate and take his best swing. Movant's lawyer was essentially a disin-
terested spectator in this game-he never left his seat, let alone lifted
the bat offhis shoulder. Such complete inattention to a criminal defend-
ant's trial cannot pass constitutional muster.
Reyes-Vasquez v. United States, 865 F. Supp. 1539, 1548 (1994). In that case,
during much of the trial, the attorney was reading. Id. at 1548 n.2. At one point,
the trial judge asked the attorney to stop reading to hear the verdict. Id.
104. See Castellanos v. United States, 26 F.3d 717, 720 (7th Cir. 1994)("A defendant is
entitled on direct appeal to legal aid in demonstrating that the district judge com-
mitted an error, and he need not make a preliminary showing of'prejudice' tanta-
mount to presenting the appeal without legal assistance."); Bonneau v. United
States, 961 F.2d 17, 23 (1st Cir. 1992)(court found ineffective assistance of coun-
sel and held that appellant did not have to show there were meritorious issues to
be appealed where defendant lost his right to direct appeal because of actions of
counsel); Lozada v. Deeds, 964 F.2d 956, 958 (9th Cir. 1991)("We hold that preju-
dice is presumed under Strickland if it is established that counsel's failure to file
a notice of appeal was without the petitioner's consent."); United States v. Davis,
929 F.2d 554, 557 (10th Cir. 1991)(holding that defendant is denied effective
assistance of counsel if he asks his lawyer to appeal and the lawyer fails to do so);
United States v. Tajeddini, 945 F.2d 458, 467 (1st Cir. 1991)(rejecting prejudice
analysis for ineffective assistance claim where counsel failed to file a notice of
appeal), cert. denied, 505 U.S. 1211 (1992); Abels v. Kaiser, 913 F.2d 821, 823
(10th Cir. 1990)("[P]etitioner alleges correctly that when courts have found coun-
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Additionally, several courts have held that counsel is per se ineffective
for failing to file an appellate brief.05 Similarly, some courts have not
required a showing of prejudice where appellate counsel filed a brief,
but the brief was especially deficient.1o6
In United States v. Swanson,107 trial counsel conceded during his
closing argument that "[a]gain in this case, I don't think it really over-
all comes to the level of raising reasonable doubt," and that if the ju-
sel constitutionally inadequate, because either retained or appointed counsel
failed to properly perfect an appeal, they do not consider the merits of arguments
that the defendant might have made on appeal."); Estes v. United States, 883
F.2d 645, 649 (8th Cir. 1989)(vacating sentence and remanding to determine if
the attorney was instructed to file an appeal, and if he was, the petitioner need
not show prejudice); Williams v. Lockhart, 849 F.2d 1134, 1137 n.3 (8th Cir.
1988)(noting that "deficient attorney performance in perfecting an appeal is prej-
udicial under the Strickland ... standard for determining ineffective assistance
of counsel."); United States v. Nagib, 844 F. Supp. 480,484 (E.D. Wis. 1993)(hold-
ing that trial attorney's failure to perfect a timely appeal was aper se violation of
the right to effective assistance of counsel); Ex parte Dunn, 514 So. 2d 1300 (Ala.
1987)(holding that failure to file brief for appeal does not require showing of prej-
udice to establish ineffective assistance where the defendant desires an appeal);
State v. Berlat, 707 P.2d 303, 307-08 (Ariz. 1985)(holding that failure to perfect a
juvenile's appeal of delinquent adjudication was per se ineffective assistance of
counsel.) See also Rodriquez v. United States, 395 U.S. 327, 330 (1969)(a defend-
ant who is denied the right to appeal does not have to show prejudice). But see
People v. Jackson, 515 N.E.2d 219 (M11. Ct. App. 1987)(applying Strickland preju-
dice test when counsel filed notice of appeal, but failed to perfect appeal).
105. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Thomas v. O'Leary, 856 F.2d 1011, 1017-18 (7th
Cir. 1988)(holding that counsel's ineffectiveness was presumptively prejudicial
where counsel failed to file opposition brief during the State's appeal of a suppres-
sion order and that harmless error analysis does not apply in such a situation);
Cannon v. Berry, 727 F.2d 1020, 1022-25 (11th Cir. 1984)(holding that defendant
does not have to show actual prejudice to get habeas relief on ground of ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel when appellate counsel failed to file a brief on direct
appeal from state trial court conviction); Carroll v. State, 468 So. 2d 186 (Ala.
Crim. App. 1985)(holding that post-conviction petitioner was denied effective
assistance on direct appeal when appointed counsel failed to file a brief). Cf
United States v. Birtle, 792 F.2d 846, 848 (9th Cir. 1986)(failure of counsel to
appear at oral argument or to file a reply brief does not warrant the application of
a per se rule of prejudice).
106. Jenkins v. Coombe, 821 F.2d 158, 161 (2d Cir. 1987)(holding that Strickland does
not apply where appellate counsel files a "paltry" and "inexcusably deficient"
brief), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1008 (1988); Robinson v. Wyrick, 635 F.2d 757, 758-
59 (8th Cir. 1981)(pre-Strickland case holding that a showing of prejudice is not
necessary when appellate counsel filed a brief but the brief was so deficient it
preserved nothing for review); Evans v. Clarke, 680 F. Supp. 1351, 1358 (D. Neb.
1988)(holding that showing of prejudice is not required when petitioner's appel-
late counsel argues that petitioner's position is without merit in brief supporting
motion to withdraw). But see Lockhart v. McCotter, 782 F.2d 1275, 1283 (5th Cir.
1986)(applying Strickland prejudice test to determine that counsel's filing of an
affidavit stating that petitioner's appeal was without merit did not constitute in-
effective assistance), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1030 (1987).
107. 943 F.2d 1070 (9th Cir. 1991).
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rors found his client guilty, they should not agonize over it in
retrospect. 0 8 The Ninth Circuit held that the concession resulted in a
deprivation of the right to due process and effective assistance of coun-
sel that was prejudicial per se.10 9 The court reasoned that the attor-
ney "abandoned his client at a critical stage of the proceedings and
affirmatively aided the prosecutor in her efforts to persuade the jury
there was no reasonable doubt."1o In effect, the defendant was with-
out counsel. Similarly, other courts have found per se ineffective
assistance of counsel where counsel admitted their clients' guilt.",1
In Frazer v. United States,112 before trial, the defendant's ap-
pointed counsel made a verbal assault on his client, including a racial
slur, and threatened to be very ineffective if the defendant insisted on
going to trial.113 The court remanded for an evidentiary hearing on
the factual allegations regarding counsel and stated that if they were
shown, prejudice supporting the Sixth Amendment violation would be
presumed.114 The court reasoned that the statements were "too extor-
tionate" to qualify as assistance of counsel.115
Finally, some courts have held that counsel's failure to investigate
can constitute a presumption of prejudice.116 Courts reason that prej-
udice is so likely in such circumstances, that it is not worth the time to
108. Id. at 1071.
109. Id. at 1074.
110. Id. at 1075. Further, the court concluded that the attorney's "abandonment of his
duty of loyalty to his client by assisting the prosecutor also created a conflict of
interest." Id.
111. See People v. Hattery, 488 N.E.2d 513, 517-18 (Ill. 1985)(finding ineffective
assistance of counsel when counsel conceded client's guilt in capital case), cert.
denied, 478 U.S. 1013 (1986); State v. Harbison, 337 S.E.2d 504 (N.C. 1985)(find-
ing per se ineffective assistance of counsel when counsel admitted the client's
guilt to the jury during closing argument without the client's consent), cert. de-
nied, 476 U.S. 1123 (1986). See also People v. Frierson, 705 P.2d 396 (Cal.
1985)(holding that counsel cannot refuse to follow the defendant's request to
present a defense at the guilty/special circumstance phase of the trial), cert. de-
nied, 502 U.S. 1061 (1992). The reasoning of these cases relies upon Brookhart v.
Janis, 384 U.S. 1 (1966), where the Court held that defense counsel could not
enter an agreement, without defendant's informed consent, to something that
amounts to a plea of guilty or nolo contendere.
112. 18 F.3d 778 (9th Cir. 1994).
113. Id. at 780.
114. Id. at 785.
115. Id. at 785.
116. Sanders v. Sullivan, 701 F. Supp. 996 (S.D.N.Y. 1987)(counsel's failure to secure
key witness's attendance at trial warranted evidentiary hearing on defendant's
claims of ineffective assistance); King v. State, 810 P.2d 119, 123 (Wyo.
1991)(presuming prejudice and finding ineffective assistance of counsel when de-
fense attorney failed to secure trial testimony of two potential eyewitnesses and
failed to interview the witnesses); Gist v. State, 737 P.2d 336, 343-44 (Wyo.
1987)(presuming prejudice when counsel did not interview alleged eye witnesses
and had no justification for not pursuing interviews).
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do a case-by-case inquiry.' 17 Thus, courts have found per se prejudice
in several situations where counsel's conduct was especially deficient.
D. Counsel Has a Conflict of Interest
Courts have not required a showing of prejudice or harmless error
analysis for ineffective assistance violations where defense counsel
had a conflict of interest, such as the situation where counsel repre-
sented defendants with conflicting interests. 1 8 As early as 1942, the
Supreme Court refused to do a prejudice analysis when a defendant's
lawyer had an actual conflict of interest." 9 In cases where an objec-
tion was made at trial to a conflict of interest and the trial judge failed
to adequately address the alleged conflict, reversal is automatic with-
out a showing of prejudice under Holloway v. Arkansas.12o Although
cases where an objection was not made at trial have not applied a per
se presumption, they have applied a limited presumption of prejudice
when the conflict has an "adverse impact" under the Cuyler v. Sulli-
van1 2 1 standard. The reasoning for not requiring a showing of preju-
117. King v. State, 810 P.2d 119, 123 (Wyo. 1991).
118. See Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 76 (1942)(prejudice need not be shown
for a Sixth Amendment violation when there is multiple representation).
119. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 76 (1942)(setting aside conviction of one
defendant when counsel had a conflict of interest). See Satterwhite v. Texas, 486
U.S. 249, 256 (1988)(court states that harmless error analysis is inappropriate
when there has been a "conflict of interest in representation throughout the en-
tire proceeding."); Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 349-50 (1980)("Thus, a de-
fendant who shows that a conflict of interest actually affected the adequacy of his
representation need not demonstrate prejudice in order to obtain relief."); Hollo-
way v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 488 (1978)("We read the Court's opinion in Glas-
ser, however, as holding that whenever a trial court improperly requires joint
representation over timely objection reversal is automatic.").
120. 435 U.S. 475, 488 (1978). Unlike cases where an objection was not made at trial,
a showing of "adverse impact" is not required when a defendant made an objec-
tion to joint representation at trial and the trial court failed to inquire adequately
into the basis of the objection. See Hamilton v. Ford, 969 F.2d 1006, 1011 (11th
Cir. 1992)(finding violation of Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments where defend-
ant timely objected to joint representation and trial court failed to investigate
conflict of interest), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1000 (1993). See also United States v.
Cook, 45 F.3d 388, 393-94 (10th Cir. 1995)(finding ineffective assistance due to
conflict of interest where objection was made at trial); State v. Jenkins, 898 P.2d
1121, 1130-31 (Kan. 1995)(the defendant's conviction must be reversed when trial
court knew that actual conflict of interest existed and failed to inquire further).
Cf United States v. Greig, 967 F.2d 1018 (5th Cir. 1992)(noting that prejudice
does not need to be shown when counsel had a conflict of interest that adversely
affected counsel's performance and district court was aware of the conflict). If a
defendant objects at trial to joint representation, a trial court must determine
whether an actual conflict exists. Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 348 (1980).
121. 446 U.S. 335, 349-50 (1980). See Frazer v. United States, 18 F.3d 778, 787 (9th
Cir. 1994)(Beezer, J., concurring); United States v. O'Leary, 806 F.2d 1307, 1312-
13 (7th Cir. 1986)(discussing difference between Cuyler standard and Holloway
standard), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987).
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dice is the same as in the denial of counsel cases: The defendant is
effectively without counsel when "the advocate's conflicting obligations
have effectively sealed his lips on crucial matters."122 In Holloway,
the Supreme Court noted, from a practical standpoint, how difficult it
is to determine actual prejudice where counsel has a conflict of
interest:
But in a case of joint representation of conflicting interests the evil ... is in
what the advocate finds himself compelled to refrain from doing, not only at
trial but also as to possible pretrial plea negotiations and in the sentencing
process. It may be possible in some cases to identify from the record the preju-
dice resulting from an attorney's failure to undertake certain trial tasks, but
even with a record of the sentencing hearing available it would be difficult to
judge intelligently the impact of a conflict on the attorney's representation of a
client. And to assess the impact of a conflict of interests on the attorney's
options, tactics, and decisions in plea negotiations would be virtually impossi-
ble. Thus, an inquiry into a claim of harmless error here would require, un-
like most cases, unguided speculation.' 23
Post-Strickland cases have followed the Court's reasoning by not re-
quiring a showing of prejudice when defense counsel has an actual
conflict of interest.124
122. Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 490 (1978). Although Holloway and Cuyler
involved conflicts of interest due to an attorney's representation of clients with
conflicting interests, the standards from those cases generally apply to other situ-
ations where a criminal defendant's attorney had a conflict of interest. United
States v. Cook, 45 F.3d 388, 393 (10th Cir. 1995). See infra notes 132-34.
123. Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 490-91 (1978). In Holloway, where one pub-
lic defender was appointed to represent three defendants charged with robbery
and rape, the Supreme Court held that when there were timely objections to a
conflict of interest of counsel and the trial judge failed to adequately address the
risk of conflict of interest, the defendants were deprived of the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel and reversal is automatic. Id. The same reasoning regarding the
difficulty in estimating the prejudice supports the Cuyler situation where a show-
ing of prejudice is not required even if counsel did not make an objection. Fur-
ther, as discussed in Part V, this same reasoning applies where counsel is
sleeping or substance impaired.
124. See, e.g., United States v. Malpiedi, 62 F.3d 465,469 (2d Cir. 1995)(applying Cuy-
ler and holding that defense attorney's representation of a records custodian
before the grand jury created a conflict that had an "adverse impact" and, there-
fore, prejudice was presumed); Lopez v. Scully, 58 F.3d 38, 41-43 (2d Cir.
1995)(applying Cuyler and holding that where defendant alleged that defense
counsel coerced him into pleading guilty, there was an actual conflict of interest
that adversely affected the lawyer's performance, prejudice was presumed, and
harmless error was found to be inappropriate); United States v. Cook, 45 F.3d
388, 393-94 (10th Cir. 1995)(applying Holloway and finding Sixth Amendment
violation without prejudice showing when trial court knew of the conflict of inter-
est); Burden v. Zant, 24 F.3d 1298, 1306-07 (11th Cir. 1994)(applying Cuyler,
finding ineffective assistance, and holding that counsel's informal understanding
with prosecutor regarding a second suspect also represented by counsel created
an actual conflict of interest that adversely affected counsel's performance);
United States v. Fulton, 5 F.3d 605, 609-12 (2d Cir. 1993)(findingper se ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel without even an "adverse impact" showing where attor-
ney is implicated in crimes of the defendant); United States v. Greig, 967 F.2d
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1. The Cuyler Test
Before courts presume prejudice in conflict of interest cases when
an objection was not made at trial, the defendant must show that an
actual conflict of interest125 exists that affected the attorney. In Bur-
1018 (5th Cir. 1992)(noting that prejudice need not be shown when counsel has a
conflict of interest and ordering a new trial when district court failed to hold a
hearing after learning that counsel had an actual conflict of interest that later
adversely affected his performance); United States v. Swartz, 975 F.2d 1042,
1048 (4th Cir. 1992)(applying Cuyler, finding ineffective assistance, and holding
that when defendant's attorney and co-counsel made legal arguments that helped
a co-defendant and harmed the defendant, there was an actual conflict of interest
that adversely affected the defendant); United States v. Ziegenhagen, 890 F.2d
937, 940-41 (7th Cir. 1989)(applying Cuyler and holding that counsel's appear-
ance against defendant at state sentencing hearing 20 years earlier constituted
an actual conflict of interest that was presumptively prejudicial); Fitzpatrick v.
McCormick, 869 F.2d 1247, 1251-53 (9th Cir. 1989)(applying Cuyler, finding inef-
fective assistance, and presuming prejudice when counsel had represented co-
defendant in first trial), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 872 (1989); Thomas v. Foltz, 818
F.2d 476, 482 (6th Cir. 1987)(holding that in a multiple representation case, once
a defendant shows counsel had an actual conflict of interest and that the conflict
had an adverse impact on counsel's performance, prejudice is presumed), cert.
denied, 484 U.S. 870 (1987); United States v. Iorizzo, 786 F.2d 52, 58 (2d Cir.
1986)(applying Cuyler, finding ineffective assistance, and presuming prejudice
when defense counsel previously represented a prosecution witness); United
States v. Ellison, 798 F.2d 1102, 1107 (7th Cir. 1986)(applying Cuyler, finding
ineffective assistance, and presuming prejudice where conflict existed because de-
fense counsel testified against defendant at hearing on motion to withdraw plea),
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1038 (1987); Ford v. Ford, 749 F.2d 681 (11th Cir. 1985)(ap-
plying Cuyler and holding, in multiple representation capital case, that prejudice
was presumed because there was an actual conflict of interest), cert. denied, 474
U.S. 909 (1985); Virgin Islands v. Zepp, 748 F.2d 125, 139 (3d Cir. 1984)(presum-
ing prejudice and finding Fifth and Sixth Amendment violations where defense
counsel faced potential criminal liability on same charges for which defendant
was tried and served as a prosecution witness); United States v. Bryant, 35 M.J.
739, 742 (A.C.M.R. 1992)(applying Cuyler, holding that counsel had actual con-
flict of interest and rendered ineffective assistance, and presuming prejudice
where counsel allowed considerations of Army in upcoming war with Iraq to in-
terfere with advice to the defendant); People v. Lawson, 644 N.E.2d 1172, 1187
(Ill. 1994)(finding ineffective assistance of counsel and per se prejudice where de-
fense counsel had appeared at defendant's arraignment on behalf of the state);
Allen v. State, 874 P.2d 60 (Okla. Crim. App. 1994)(where actual conflict of inter-
est in counsel's representation of both defendant and co-defendant at different
times, prejudice is presumed); Tarwater v. State, 383 S.E.2d 883 (Ga. 1989)(ap-
plying Cuyler in a multiple representation case). See also Whiteside v. Scurr, 744
F.2d 1323, 1330 (8th Cir. 1984)(applying Cuyler limited presumption where coun-
sel had a conflict of interest with client and the attorney threatened to testify
against the client), rev'd, 475 U.S. 157 (1986).
125. "An actual, as opposed to a potential, conflict of interest exists 'when, during the
course of the representation, the attorney's and defendant's interests' diverge
with respect to a material factual or legal issue or to a course of action." United
States v. Malpiedi, 62 F.3d 465, 469 (2d Cir. 1995)(quoting Winkler v. Keane, 7
F.3d 304, 307 (2d Cir. 1993)(quoting Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 356 n.3
(1980)), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1407 (1994)).
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ger v. Kemp,' 26 the Court followed Cuyler v. Sullivan 27 and held
where two attorneys in the same firm or one attorney represents coin-
dictees, prejudice is presumed "only if the defendant demonstrates
that counsel 'actively represented conflicting interests' and that 'an ac-
tual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer's perform-
ance."- 28 Similarly, in Virgin Islands v. Zepp,129 the Third Circuit
Court of Appeals held that to show a conflict of interest in violation of
the Sixth Amendment, a defendant has "to 'prove (1) multiple repre-
sentation that (2) created an actual conflict of interest that (3) ad-
versely affected the lawyer's performance."130 If these requirements
are met, prejudice is presumed.'31
Although Cuyler applied the "actual conflict" and "adverse effect"
standards to a situation involving multiple representation, and the
United States Supreme Court has not addressed the question of the
scope of Cuyler,'3 2 several lower courts have applied the Cuyler stan-
dard to various kinds of attorney ethical conflicts.133 However, at
126. 483 U.S. 776, 783 (1987)(holding that an attorney's partnership with another at-
torney representing his client's co-indictee in a separate prosecution did not con-
stitute active representation of a competing interest).
127. 446 U.S. 335, 349-50 (1980)("Thus, a defendant who shows that a conflict of inter-
est actually affected the adequacy of his representation need not demonstrate
prejudice in order to obtain relief.")
128. Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 783 (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668, 692 (1984)(citation omitted). "And it has even been said that such an actual
conflict of interest may never be harmless error." United States v. Swartz, 975
F.2d 1042, 1048 (4th Cir. 1992)(citing Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 76
(1942).
129. 748 F.2d 125, 139 (3d Cir. 1984).
130. Id. at 134 (quoting Sullivan v. Cuyler, 723 F.2d 1077, 1084 (3d Cir. 1983)).
131. Id. at 139.
132. "The Supreme Court has not specifically addressed whether Cuyler applies to
cases involving conflicts stemming from sources other than multiple representa-
tion." Beets v. Scott, 65 F.3d 1258, 1295 (5th Cir. 1995)(King, J., dissent-
ing)(citing Illinois v. Washington, 469 U.S. 1022, 1023 (1984)(White, J.,
dissenting from denial of certiorari)), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1547 (1996). In
Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261 (1981), however, the Court did apply the Cuyler
test to a conflict of interest arising from the fact that the defendants' attorney
was being paid by a third party. One lower court, however, has categorized the
Wood situation as being the functional equivalent of joint representation. See
Beets v. Scott, 65 F.3d 1258, 1267 (5th Cir. 1995).
133. See, e.g., United States v. Hanoum, 33 F.3d 1128, 1130-32 (9th Cir. 1994)(apply-
ing Cuyler where allegations were that attorney was having sex with the defend-
ant's wife and thus had an incentive to make sure that the defendant was found
guilty), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1702 (1995); Winkler v. Keane, 7 F.3d 304, 307-10
(2d Cir. 1993)(criminal defense contingency fee arrangement), cert. denied, 114 S.
Ct. 1407 (1994); United States v. Sayan, 968 F.2d 55, 64-65 (D.C. Cir. 1992)(ap-
plying Cuyler to alleged conflict created by lawyer's fear of antagonizing the
judge); United States v. Michaud, 925 F.2d 37, 40-42 (1st Cir. 1991)(applying
Cuyler where defense attorney in tax case taught classes to IRS agents on how to
detect tax fraud); United States v. Horton, 845 F.2d 1414, 1418-21 (7th Cir.
1988)(applying Cuyler where attorney was candidate for U.S. Attorney during his
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least one federal court of appeals has limited the application of the
Cuyler test to the multiple representation situation.1 3 4
The "adverse effect" requirement in the conflict of interest cases is
not the same as the prejudice requirement.
Prejudice requires a probability that the outcome of trial would have been
different. In contrast, an adverse consequence requires a likelihood that coun-
sel's performance somehow would have been different. To establish that a
conflict of interest adversely affected counsel's performance, the defendant
must show that the conflict 'likely' affected counsel's conduct of particular as-
pects of the trial or counsel's advocacy on behalf of the defendant.1 3 5
representation of the defendant); United States v. McLain, 823 F.2d 1457, 1463-
64 (11th Cir. 1987)(applying Cuyler where lawyer was under investigation for
bribery); United States v. Andrews, 790 F.2d 803, 810-11 (10th Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 481 U.S. 1018 (1987)(applying Cuyler where court refused to allow attor-
ney to withdraw from representation and start medical school); United States v.
Fahey, 769 F.2d 829, 836 (1st Cir. 1987)(applying Cuyler where the attorney's
former law partner was a potential witness and was not called to testify); Roach
v. Martin, 757 F.2d 1463, 1479-80 (4th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 865
(1985)(applying Cuyler where attorney was being investigated by the state bar
while representing the defendant).
134. Recently, the Fifth Circuit, sitting en bane, held that Strickland, not Cuyler, is
the test to apply in situations involving attorney self-interest conflicts. Beets v.
Scott, 65 F.3d 1258, 1270-72 (5th Cir. 1995)(en bane), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1547
(1996). In an 8-5 decision, the court reasoned: "If Cuyler's more rigid rule applies
to attorney breaches of loyalty outside the multiple representation context,
Strickland's desirable and necessary uniform standard of constitutional ineffec-
tiveness will be challenged." Id. at 1272. See Alexandra N. DeNeve, Note, Recent
Development: The Fifth Circuit Adopts the Strickland Test to Deal with Ineffective
Assistance Claims that Arise from Conflicts of Interest that Do Not Involve Multi-
ple- or Serial-Client Representation, 70 TuL. L. REv. 1689 (1996). See also John-
ston v. Mizell, 912 F.2d 172, 177 (7th Cir. 1990)(noting that Cuyler does not apply
to every ineffective assistance claim involving a conflict of interest), cert. denied,
498 U.S. 1094 (1991).
Additionally, the Ninth Circuit has noted it is not "logically necessary" that
Cuyler also applies "to conflicts between a defendant's and the attorney's own
personal interests." Garcia v. Bunnell, 33 F.3d 1193, 1198 n.4 (9th Cir. 1994),
cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1374 (1995). Still, as discussed in the previous footnote,
the majority of courts do not limit Cuyler to only multiple representation cases.
See Beets v. Scott, 65 F.3d 1258, 1295-96 (5th Cir. 1995)(King, J., dissenting).
135. Frazer v. United States, 18 F.3d 778, 787 (9th Cir. 1994)(Beezer, J., concur-
ring)(citations omitted). "Adverse effect is not the equivalent of prejudice, the
reasonable probability of a different result, as the term 'prejudice' is defined in
Strickland. Injury sufficient to justify reversal is presumed from the showing of
adverse effect." United States v. Greig, 967 F.2d 1018, 1024 (5th Cir. 1992)(quot-
ing States v. Abner, 825 F.2d 835, 843 (5th Cir. 1987)(citing Nealy v. Cabana, 782
F.2d 1362, 1365 (5th Cir. 1986))). The "adverse impact" test only requires the
defendant to show there was a plausible alternative strategy that was inherently
in conflict with the attorney's other interests. United States v. Malpiedi, 62 F.3d
465, 469 (2d Cir. 1995). However, the defendant does not have to show the alter-
native strategy was reasonable, the counsel's conduct affected the outcome of the
trial, or that, but for the conflict, counsel's conduct would have been different. Id.
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In some extreme situations, courts do not require a showing of "ad-
verse impact."136
Thus, the conflict of interest cases create another area where courts
do not require a showing of prejudice for an ineffective assistance of
counsel claim.
IV. MENTALLY IMPAIRED AND SLEEPING
ATTORNEY CASES
A. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims Where Counsel
was Intoxicated, Abusing Drugs, or Mentally Ill
In cases where a criminal defendant's attorney has been impaired
due to alcohol or drugs, the lower courts have uniformly applied the
Strickland test to evaluate a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel
and required the defendant to show prejudice. In Berry v. King,137 the
Fifth Circuit held that the fact that an attorney used drugs is not, "in
and of itself, relevant to an ineffective assistance claim."13s While not-
ing that the question of whether the attorney used drugs during the
trial was not settled, the court stressed that the proper inquiry is the
Strickland test.1 3 9 The Fifth Circuit followed this reasoning in a situ-
ation where the defendant claimed that his attorney was ineffective
due to alcohol abuse because the defendant could smell alcohol on his
attorney's breath during trial, and after the trial, the attorney entered
a facility for treatment of alcohol abuse.140
136. In United States v. Fulton, 5 F.3d 605 (2d Cir. 1993), the Second Circuit noted
that "adverse impact" does not have to be shown "When an attorney is implicated
in the crimes of his or her client since, in that event, the attorney cannot be free
from fear that a 'vigorous defense should lead the prosecutor or the trial judge to
discover' evidence of the attorney's 'own wrongdoing.' "Id. at 611 (citations omit-
ted). In Fulton, the court held the defendant did not have to show adverse impact
where the lead trial counsel was engaged with him in heroin trafficking. Id. at
612. See Allen v. State, 874 P.2d 260, 264 (Okla. Crim. App. 1994)(defendant did
not have to show adverse effect where attorney did not tell the client that he
previously represented someone else in the same manner); Tarwater v. State, 383
S.E.2d 883, 885 (Ga. 1989)(holding that per se "adverse impact" found when an
attorney representing multiple defendants negotiates a plea bargain conditioned
upon more than one client pleading guilty); State v. Cyrs, 529 A.2d 947, 950 (N.H.
1987)(finding per se "adverse impact" where the State knew of the conflict of in-
terest when the defense attorney had been a target in the investigation that led
to the client's arrest).
137. 765 F.2d 451, 454 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1164 (1986).
138. Id. (emphasis added).
139. Id. Thus, the court basically ignored the drug abuse allegations and concentrated
on the specific allegations of deficient performance and prejudice. Id.
140. Burnett v. Collins, 982 F.2d 922, 930 (5th Cir. 1993). The court rejected the argu-
ment that counsel was per se ineffective because of the alcohol abuse and, as in
Berry, noted that the defendant had failed to show that counsel was impaired
during trial due to alcohol abuse. Id.
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In Fowler v. Parratt,141 the defendant's trial attorney was later
found incompetent to practice law because the attorney admitted he
was an alcoholic and suffered blackouts during the time he repre-
sented the defendant. However, the Eighth Circuit rejected the de-
fendant's argument that once it is established that the attorney is an
alcoholic there should be a rebuttable presumption that the attorney
was ineffective.34 2 Instead, the court found the defendant failed to
show that he was prejudiced by any of the errors he claimed that his
attorney committed.143
Similarly, the California Supreme Court rejected a defendant's
claim that his attorney was per se ineffective due to his alcoholism.144
The attorney was an alcoholic who died of the disease following the
trial.145 It was undisputed that the attorney was an alcoholic at the
time of the representation and that he consumed large amounts of al-
cohol each day of the trial146 Evidence was submitted that the attor-
ney drank in the morning, during court recesses, and throughout the
evenings.' 47 During the second day of jury selection, the attorney was
arrested for driving to the courthouse with a .27 blood-alcohol con-
tent.148 The day after the arrest, the judge made an inquiry into the
matter and gave the defendant the opportunity to have new counsel
appointed, but the defendant declined.-49 The judge stated that the
attorney's courtroom behavior gave no reason for his removal and per-
sonally assured the defendant before trial "that you probably have one
of the finest defense counsel in this county" and after trial that counsel
"has been one of the better defense attorneys in this county.150 In
rejecting a per se rule, the court reasoned that such a rule would cre-
ate a presumption against the competence of alcoholic attorneys and
would invite defendants to challenge their convictions on the basis of
speculation about the drinking habits of their attorneys. 15 '
141. 682 F.2d 746, 750 (8th Cir. 1982).
142. Id. at 750.
143. Id. Although Fowler was a pre-Strickland case, the court applied the same two-
part test as Strickland did: "First, there must have been a failure on the part of
defense counsel to perform some essential duty owed to the client; second, that
failure must have resulted in prejudice to the defense." Id. at 748 (citing Mc-
Queen v. Swenson, 498 F.2d 207 (8th Cir. 1974)).
144. People v. Garrison, 765 P.2d 419 (Cal. 1989).





150. Id. at 440-41.
151. Id. at 441. The court rejected the defendant's claim that his attorney's perform-
ance was deficient. Id.
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Other state and federal courts have held that abuse of alcohol,15 2
cocaine, 153 or prescription medication154 does not create per se ineffec-
152. See United States v. Scaretta, No. 96-1151(L), 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 2696, at 16-
18 (2d Cir. Feb. 12, 1997) (holding that an attorney's alcoholism, by itself, does
not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel per se; United States v. Germain,
No. 95-6723, 76 F.3d 376 (table), 1996 WL 43578, at *5 (4th Cir. Feb. 5,
1996)(holding that even if allegations about attorney being intoxicated during a
Rule 11 hearing were true, there was no evidence that the attorney's performance
fell below objective standards of reasonableness or that defendant was
prejudiced); Hernandez v. Wainwright, 634 F. Supp. 241 (S.D. Fla. 1986), affd
without op., 813 F.2d 409 (11th Cir. 1987)(applying Strickland and finding no
ineffective assistance); State v. Machado, No. 94-1170, 95-1199, 551 N.W. 2d 62
(table), 1996 WL 252562, at *2-3 (Wis. Ct. App. May 15, 1996)(holding that in
light of trial court's finding that counsel's drug and alcohol problems did not man-
ifest themselves during the trial, the defendant did not sustain burden to prove
counsel performed deficiently). See also O'Brien v. Commonwealth, 74 S.W. 666
(Ky. 1903)(refusing relief to a condemned prisoner where his lawyer was alleg-
edly drunk during the trial). Cf State v. Keller, 223 N.W. 698, 699 (N.D.
1929)(finding that where counsel was so drunk the defendant in effect had no
counsel, the defendant was "clearly prejudiced").
153. See State v. Coates, 786 P.2d 1182 (Mont. 1990)(court applied Strickland and
found that the attorney's use of cocaine was irrelevant to claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel). In Gardner v. Dixon, No. 92-4013, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS
28147 (4th Cir. 1992)(per curiam), the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held that
newly discovered evidence of counsel's cocaine and alcohol abuse during trial did
not affect its previous finding under Strickland that counsel's performance was
not deficient and that the defendant was not prejudiced. Ad. at *29-30. The
newly discovered evidence consisted of "numerous affidavits" detailing counsel's
use of drugs and alcohol and the disabling impact of the use of cocaine. Id. at *17-
24. However, affidavits submitted by the State, including one by the trial judge,
indicated that counsel did not display signs of substance abuse. Id. at *24-26.
Two days after the decision by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, John Gardner
was executed in North Carolina. Man Is Put to Death for Double Slaying During
Crime Spree, N.Y. Tnis, Oct. 24, 1992, at A7. One commentator noted, "[Flew
people would want their lives to depend upon the investigation and preparation
of a drug-dependent lawyer. This case is troubling; it demonstrates just how de-
manding and unfair the prejudice prong of Strickland is." Clarke, supra note 45,
at 1369-70.
154. In McDougall v. Dixon, 921 F.2d 518, 534-35 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 501
U.S. 1223 (1991), the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals found the defendant did
not show prejudice from the fact that counsel was being treated for depression
and severe migraines and taking medication. The court reasoned: "Many lawyers
and judges are on various forms of medication while attending to their duties in
the courtroom, but this is not the test. The appellant must show that the medica-
tion affected his attorney in such a way that the attorney could not and did not
render adequate legal assistance during the trial." Id. at 535. See also Bonin v.
Vasquez, 794 F. Supp. 957 (C.D. Cal. 1992)(applying Strickland and holding that
the defense attorney's use and alleged abuse of prescription medication did not
affect his performance at trial); Fellman v. Poole, No. C 90-20007 JW, 1993 WL
248693, at *5 (N.D. Cal. June 28, 1993)(rejecting ineffective assistance of counsel
claim where defense counsel took medications for high blood pressure, physiologi-
cal depression, migraines, and ulcers, but two doctors testified at a motion for
retrial that counsel functioned well on those medications).
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tiveness.Z55 Similarly, the few courts that have addressed the issue
have uniformly applied the Strickland test where criminal defendants
claimed their attorneys were ineffective due to psychological ailments.
In Bellamy v. Cogdell,156 the defendant in a murder trial was repre-
sented by a 71-year old attorney who, according to the attorney's phy-
sician, suffered from a variety of physiological ailments around the
time of the trial, was "virtually incapacitated," and was unable to con-
centrate at times. 5 7 In the months before, and during the trial, the
attorney, Sidney Guran, was subject to disciplinary proceedings. In
those proceedings, Guran's attorney had requested the hearing be ad-
journed because Guran was "not mentally capable of preparing for the
hearing."x58 In a letter to the disciplinary committee, Guran said that
he was essentially retired and had taken no new work except for the
case of Bellamy, who he had previously represented. Guran told the
committee that he would have a competent attorney assist him in rep-
resenting Bellamy, although because of other commitments of the
other attorney, Guran ended up representing Bellamy alone.15 9 More
than two months after Bellamy's conviction, Guran was suspended
from the practice of law.160 On a petition for writ of habeas corpus, a
panel of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals applied aper se rule and
found counsel ineffective. The court, however, reheard the case in
banc and voted 7-6 to reject the per se rule and apply the Strickland
test.16
The court noted that it applied a per se rule in two limited circum-
stances: where counsel was not licensed to practice law because of a
155. See also Young v. Zant, 727 F.2d 1489, 1492-93 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470
U.S. 1009 (1985). In Young, which was decided prior to Strickland, the court
found no ineffective assistance where John Young's defense counsel allegedly
used drugs during trial, testified at state habeas corpus proceedings that he had a
drug problem, and was convicted for possession of marijuana shortly after
Young's trial. Id. John Young was executed in 1985. See McFarland v. Scott,
114 S. Ct. 2785, 2787 (1994)(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
156. 974 F.2d 302 (2d Cir. 1992)(en banc), vacating, 952 F.2d 626 (2d Cir. 1991), cert.
denied, 507 U.S. 960 (1993).
157. Id. at 304-05.
158. Id. at 303.
159. Id. at 304.
160. Id. Compare United States v. Novak, 903 F.2d 883, 890 (2d Cir. 1990)(findingper
se prejudice where the defendant was represented by a person who had obtained
admission to the bar through fraudulent means and was later disbarred) and
People v. Hinkley, 193 Cal. App. 3d 383, 387, (1987)(finding a Sixth Amendment
violation and vacating conviction where an attorney was placed on "inactive" list
prior to defendant's trial because the attorney had become incompetent to repre-
sent clients) with Commonwealth v. Vance, 546 A.2d 632, 637 (Pa. 1988)(finding
no Sixth Amendment violation where attorney was disbarred because disbarment
is not the same as never having been admitted to the bar).
161. The dissent in Bellamy argued that a per se rule should apply. Bellamy v.
Cogdell, 974 F.2d 302, 309-13 (2d Cir. 1992)(en bane), vacating, 952 F.2d 626 (2d
Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 560 (1993).
[Vol. 75:425
DRINK, DRUGS, AND DROWSINESS
failure to meet the substantive requirements for the practice of law162
and where counsel was implicated in the defendant's crimes.163 The
court noted two rationales for applying the per se rule: (1) where coun-
sel is not duly licensed, the failure to provide counsel to a criminal
defendant creates a jurisdictional bar to conviction; and (2) where
counsel is implicated in the defendant's crimes, there is a conflict of
interest.164 The court stated that application of aper se rule must be
justified under one or both of the rationales, but the court did not ex-
plain why it was limited to those rationales. The court further stated
that neither rationale applied to the case because Guran was admitted
to the bar, there was no fraudulent behavior, and there was no conflict
of interest.165 Further, the court reasoned that a per se rule should
not apply because there is nothing inherent in an attorney's illness
that will impair his or her representation most of the time. Therefore,
the court concluded, such claims are better suited to the fact-specific
prejudice inquiry of Strickland.166 The court also noted that a hear-
ing resulted in the finding that Guran had no mental incapacity at the
time of trial.167
In Smith v. Ylst,168 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals also re-
jected a claim that aper se ineffectiveness rule should apply where the
defense attorney is mentally ill. The defendant argued that mental
illness, like sleeping, required aper se ineffectiveness rule.169 The de-
fendant submitted declarations describing the trial attorney's conduct
during the time of trial and of trial preparation.170 The declarations
indicated that the attorney believed his life was in danger and he dis-
cussed a conspiracy theory during his opening argument.' 7 1 The at-
torney's secretary said that the attorney told her he was crazy and
wanted to go to an insane asylum.' 72 Two psychiatric reports indi-
cated that the attorney exhibited a paranoid psychotic reaction, but
the prosecuting attorney offered a declaration that the attorney acted
no differently than any other criminal defense attorney. 173 The court
affirmed the district court's rejection of aper se rule and held that the
trial court was not required to sua sponte hold a hearing on the issue
162. See United States v. Novak, 903 F.2d 883, 890 (2d Cir. 1990)(counsel fraudulently
obtained a license); Solina v. United States, 709 F.2d 160, 167 (2d Cir.
1983)(counsel was not a member of any bar).
163. See United States v. Cancilla, 725 F.2d 867, 870 (2d Cir. 1984).
164. Bellamy v. Cogdell, 974 F.2d 302, 306-07 (2d Cir. 1992).
165. Id. at 307-08.
166. Id. at 308.
167. Id.
168. 826 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 829 (1988).
169. Id. at 875.






of defense counsel's competency. 174 The court noted that the trial
court reasonably found that the evidence did not raise a genuine doubt
about the attorney's competence. 175 This finding is similar to the find-
ings in several other cases discussed in this Article that dealt with
allegations about the attorney's substance abuse or competency.
Thus, courts apply the Strickland test where defense attorneys are
mentally impaired due to drugs, alcohol, or psychological ailments. In
none of these cases did a court find that the allegedly impaired attor-
ney was constitutionally ineffective.
B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims Where Counsel
Slept During Trial
The one area of attorney mental "impairment" where courts have
applied a per se ineffective assistance rule is where a criminal defense
attorney sleeps through a substantial portion of the trial. In Javor v.
United States,176 a pre-Strickland case, the Ninth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals held that "when an attorney for a criminal defendant sleeps
through a substantial portion of the trial, such conduct is inherently
prejudicial and thus no separate showing of prejudice is necessary."17 7
In Javor, a federal magistrate found no prejudice but found that de-
fense counsel slept or was not alert during a substantial portion of a
trial for sale and possession of heroin.178 The court applied a per se
rule because "unconscious or sleeping counsel is equivalent to no coun-
sel at all."179 The court reasoned that requiring a showing of preju-
dice would require "unguided speculation" and could not be applied
even-handedly "because an attorney's absence prejudices a defendant
more by what was not done than by what was done."180
174. Id. at 877.
175. Id.
176. 724 F.2d 831 (9th Cir. 1984).
177. Id. at 833 (citing Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 489-91 (1978) and Rinker
v. County of Napa, 724 F.2d 1352, 1354 (9th Cir. 1983)(per curiam)).
178. Id. at 832-33. Perhaps part of the reason the appellate court was willing to apply
a per se rule to this case was the somewhat inconsistent findings of the magis-
trate. Initially, the magistrate found that the defense attorney slept during a
substantial portion of the trial, including during times when important evidence
was being elicited and "the participation of trial counsel ... was proper." Id. at
832. However, the magistrate concluded the defendant was not prejudiced and
recommended that relief be denied. After the appellate court ordered an eviden-
tiary hearing regarding whether there was actual prejudice, the magistrate found
that the attorney made proper objections and "presented as adequate a defense as
the facts appear to have permitted." Id. at 833.
179. Id. at 834.
180. Id. at 835 (quoting Cooper v. Fitzharris, 586 F.2d at 1325, 1332 (9th Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 440 U.S. 974 (1978)(quoting Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475,
490, 491)). "The magistrate's second report on the issue of prejudice found no
error based on Javor's attorney's conscious participation in the trial. The real
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In United States v. Petersen,'5 ' a post-Strickland case out of the
Ninth Circuit, the court applied Javor, but found that the attorney
had not been sleeping or dozing during a substantial portion of trial.
Thus, the court concluded that the defendant had the burden of show-
ing prejudice under Strickland and the defendant did not meet that
burden.182 A California district court followed the Peterson reasoning
and found no presumption of prejudice where counsel twice "may have
nodded off during the trial"l83 because "he did not sleep through a
substantial portion of the two-month trial."184
In Tippins v. Walker,1S5 another post-Strickland case, the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals followed the reasoning of Javor by applying a
per se rule in certain situations where counsel slept during trial. How-
ever, the Second Circuit rejected the Javor test that required a finding
of per se prejudice when counsel sleeps during a "substantial" portion
of the trial.86 The court noted that the word "substantial" was un-
helpful because the Javor court did not explain what was meant by
"substantial," which could refer to the length of time counsel slept, the
significance of the proceedings, or the proportion of the proceedings
missed.3187 The court stated that ordinarily the Strickland analysis
would be sufficient for episodes of inattention or sleep, noting that:
Prolonged inattention during stretches of a long trial (by sleep, preoccupa-
tion or otherwise), particularly during periods concerned with other defend-
ants, uncontested issues, or matters peripheral to a particular defendant, may
be quantitatively substantial but without consequence. At such times, even
alert and resourceful counsel cannot affect the proceedings to a client's
advantage.1 88
The court noted, however, that the Strickland standard allows a
court to consider an improper decision by counsel as a strategy deci-
sion, but the underlying assumption in such a situation is that counsel
question was the effect of his failure to participate in the substantial portion of
the trial during which he slept." Id. at 835.
181. 777 F.2d 482, 484 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 843 (1986).
182. Id. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit also
referred to Javor in the context of the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel
where counsel sleeps through trial. United States v. Debango, 780 F.2d 81, 86
(D.C. Cir. 1986). However, in Debango, the court did not address the claim be-
cause the defendant failed to submit any evidence on the issue to the district
court to support his motion for a new trial. Id. See also United States v.
Onaghise, No. 94-16679, 85 F.3d 638 (table), 1996 WL 204544, at *2 (9th Cir.
April 22, 1996)(rejecting ineffective assistance claim because of insufficient evi-
dence of sleeping).
183. Fellman v. Poole, No. C 90-20007 JW, 1993 WL 248693, at *5 (N.D. Cal. June 28,
1993)(denying habeas petitioner's ineffective assistance of counsel claim).
184. Id.
185. 77 F.3d 682 (2d Cir. 1996).
186. Id. at 685.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 686.
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is alert and able to exercise judgment.s 9 Specifically, the court
stated:
[Als the majority reasoned in Javor, "prejudice is inherent" at some point,
"because unconscious or sleeping counsel is equivalent to no counsel at all."
Effectiveness of counsel depends in part on the ability to confer with the client
during trial on a continuous basis, and the attorney must be "present and
attentive" in order to make adequate cross-examination--"a matter of consti-
tutional importance" by virtue of the Sixth Amendment. Moreover, if counsel
sleeps, the ordinary analytical tools for identifying prejudice are unavailable.
The errors and lost opportunities may not be visible in the record, and the
reviewing court applying the traditional Strickland analysis may be forced to
engage in "unguided speculation." 190
Thus, the Tippins court applied the following test: the defendant
"suffered prejudice, by presumption or otherwise, if his counsel was
repeatedly unconscious at trial for periods of time in which defend-
ant's interests were at stake."191 The court then noted that the dis-
trict court found that the defendant's attorney slept every day of the
trial and during critical testimony. The court further noted that the
record showed that the attorney was actually unconscious and his
"sleeping was not a fitful inattention or a meditative focusing of the
mind's powers."' 9 2
Finally, the court concluded that the defendant's interests were at
stake during the time of unconsciousness.193 Witnesses later testified
that counsel was sleeping during specific key witnesses.194 Further,
reprimands by the trial court did not cure the sleeping problem,
although the reprimands illustrated the "dangerous character of the
problem."195 Thus, the court found the defendant was deprived of ef-
fective assistance of counsel in violation of his Sixth Amendment right
to counsel.196
In general, unlike the mental impairment cases, courts have found
ineffective assistance of counsel and a presumption of prejudice in the
sleeping counsel cases. Still, the two circuit courts that have ad-
189. Id. at 686-87.
190. Id. at 686 (citations omitted).
191. Id. at 687.
192. Id. at 689. The court discussed the state's analogies to other kinds of lawyer
impairment that have not been found to warrant findings of per se prejudice, in-
cluding the cases discussed above about drug abuse, alcohol abuse, and mental
impairment. Id. at 688-89. While noting that consciousness and sleep form a
continuum and there are varying states of drowsiness, the court stressed that in
this case it was clear that counsel was unconscious. Id. at 689. Witnesses heard
the counsel snoring and saw his head down as if sleeping. Id.
193. Id. at 689.
194. Id. at 689-90.
195. Id. at 690.
196. Id.
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dressed this issue are split on the question of what must be shown to
constitute per se prejudice.19 7
V. PROPOSED STANDARDS FOR INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE
OF COUNSEL CLAIMS INVOLVING SLEEPING OR
MENTALLY IMPAIRED COUNSEL
A. The Existing Framework
Parts III and IV of this Article addressed several ineffective assist-
ance of counsel cases where courts have not applied the Strickland
requirement that the defendant show prejudice. In those cases, to va-
rying degrees, defendants were effectively without counsel. There is a
continuum of ineffective assistance of counsel cases, with one extreme
being no counsel and the other extreme being competent counsel.' 9 8
If, under the courts' reasoning, one were to rank the various right to
counsel situations from the most egregious constitutional violations to
the least egregious situations, the list would look like this:
(1) no counsel at all;
(2) no counsel at a "critical stage" of the trial;
(3) surrounding circumstances prevent defense attorney from being able to act
as counsel;
(4) "counsel" does not meet substantive requirements for Bar admission;
(5) counsel has a conflict of interest and an objection is made at trial;
(6) counsel sleeps during a portion of the trial (Javor/Tippins standards);
(7) counsel is egregiously ineffective, such as where counsel refuses to partici-
pate in the trial, does not file an appeal, or concedes guilt;
(8) counsel has a conflict of interest and no objection is made at trial;
(9) counsel is drunk, using drugs, or otherwise substantially mentally
impaired;
(10) counsel made errors at trial that may or may not have prejudiced the
client; and
(11) counsel made no errors.
In categories 1-7, courts generally do not require a showing of prej-
udice for a Sixth Amendment violation. Courts, however, are not con-
197. The U.S. Supreme Court has never addressed the issue of whether prejudice is
required in sleeping counsel cases. See Exparte Burdine, 901 S.W.2d 456, 457-58
(Tex. Crim. App. 1995)(Maloney, J., dissenting). Additionally, the issue currently
is being litigated in the Fifth Circuit in Burdine v. Scott, No. H-94-4190 (E.D.
Tex.). See Mark Ballard, Sleeping-Lawyer Claim Brings Stay of Execution, TEx.
LAw., April 17, 1995, at 6.
198. See United States v. DeCoster, 624 F.2d 196, 201 (D.C. Cir. 1976). In this pre-
Strickland case, the court noted:
The cases present a continuum. At one end are cases of structural or
procedural impediments by the state that prevent the accused from re-
ceiving the benefits of the constitutional guarantee. The most obvious
example is, of course, the failure of the state to provide any counsel
whatever.... At the other end of the continuum are cases ... in which
the issue is counsel's performance when he is 'untrammelled and
unimpaired' by state action.
Id. at 201-02 (footnote omitted).
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clusive on category 6 regarding sleeping counsel. Why no prejudice
should be required for this category, as well as how this category
should be defined, is discussed below. In category 8, regarding conflict
of interest cases where no objection was made at trial, courts place a
higher burden on defendants but they do not require a showing of
prejudice if other showings are made. In categories 9-11, courts apply
the Strickland test and require a showing of prejudice before making a
finding of ineffective assistance of counsel.19 9 However, I argue below
that the substance impaired or mentally impaired attorney cases, cat-
egory 9, are closer to the conflict of interest cases than the Strickland
cases and, therefore, a test similar to the conflict of interest test
should apply to the substance impaired or mentally impaired attorney
cases.
In the next two sections, this Article addresses the sleeping and
impaired attorney situations and what standards should apply.
Although there are not a lot of cases about impaired or sleeping attor-
neys, there are three different standards that have been applied by
the courts. First, in the non-sleep impairment cases and in certain
sleep cases, courts apply the standard Strickland two-prong test re-
quiring deficient performance and prejudice.200 Second, in sleeping
cases, the Ninth Circuit finds per se prejudice in the situation where
defense counsel sleeps during a "substantial portion of the trial."201
Third, in sleeping cases, the Second Circuit finds per se prejudice if
three requirements are satisfied: (1) counsel was unconscious; (2) for
repeated and prolonged lapses; and (3) the defendant's interests were
at stake during those times.20 2
As discussed above, there are two additional standards used in sit-
uations where ineffective assistance of counsel claims have been
made. First, in situations that result in an actual or effective denial of
the assistance of counsel, courts find constitutional error without a
showing of prejudice. This standard applies when counsel is physi-
cally absent from a critical stage of the proceedings, surrounding cir-
cumstances prevent counsel from being able to adequately represent a
defendant, counsel does not meet the substantive requirements for bar
admission, counsel has a conflict of interest and an objection was
made at trial, and counsel's performance is especially egregious, such
as when counsel refuses to participate in the trial or concedes the cli-
199. Technically, category 11, where an attorney makes no mistakes, does not require
a showing of prejudice because the attorney is not ineffective if she makes no
mistakes. I include this category in the Strickland group, however, because often
courts do not address the issue of whether counsel made errors when they can
resolve the question of ineffectiveness only by looking at whether the defendant
was prejudiced by the alleged errors.
200. See, e.g., Bellamy v. Cogdell, 974 F.2d 302 (2d Cir. 1992).
201. See, e.g., Javor v. United States, 724 F.2d 831 (9th Cir. 1984).
202. See, e.g., Tippins v. Walker, 77 F.3d 682 (2d Cir. 1996).
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ent's guilt. In all of these situations, a defendant is effectively without
counsel, and "the process loses its character as a confrontation be-
tween adversaries."20 3 Thus, prejudice is presumed.
Second, courts apply a different test when defense counsel has a
conflict of interest and no objection was made at trial. Under Cuyler,
if an actual conflict of interest exists that adversely impacts the de-
fense lawyer's performance, prejudice is presumed.204 To show "ad-
verse impact," a defendant only needs to show there was a possible
strategy that was in conflict with the attorney's other interests.
In discussing the proposed standards for the impaired attorney sit-
uations, one should keep in mind the factors considered by the
Supreme Court in evaluating whether or not to use a per se prejudice
rule:2 05 (1) whether it would be especially difficult to measure the pre-
cise effect of errors on the defense;206 (2) whether prejudice is so inher-
ent in such a situation that it would be a waste of the court's time to
do a case-by-case analysis; 207 (3) whether there has been such a
breakdown in the judicial process that the defendant was effectively
without counsel;208 (4) whether the Sixth Amendment violation is
easy to identify, and for that reason, because the prosecution is di-
rectly responsible, the violation is easy for the government to pre-
vent;209 (5) whether defense counsel is burdened by an actual conflict
of interest;210 and (6) whether the attorney errors can be defined with
enough precision to inform attorneys what conduct to avoid.211
B. Proposed Standard for Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Claims Involving Sleeping Counsel
The Strickland standard is based upon a presumption that coun-
sel's conduct "falls within the wide range of reasonable professional
203. United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 656-57 (1984).
204. Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 349-50 (1980).
205. See generally, discussion infra Part III. In the cases where the courts use aperse
prejudice rule, there is often no discussion about the deficient performance
Strickland prong. The conduct giving rise to the presumption of prejudice, such
as counsel's sleeping, appears to be enough to constitute deficient performance.
Because the performance prong of the Strickland test includes a strong presump-
tion that counsel's actions were within the "wide range of reasonable professional
assistance," Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984), courts should,
and sometimes appear to, eliminate that presumption when counsel sleeps or is
otherwise impaired. Thus, in cases where there is genuine attorney impairment,
deficient performance should be found by the court. The difficult question is
whether or not prejudice must be shown.
206. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 692 (1984).
207. Id.
208. Id. See generally Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
209. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 692 (1984).
210. Id.
211. Id. at 693.
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assistance."2 12 The prejudice requirement is based upon the belief
that "the purpose of the Sixth Amendment guarantee of counsel is to
ensure that a defendant has the assistance necessary to justify reli-
ance on the outcome of the proceedings."213 However, these founda-
tions of the Strickland test do not apply where counsel is asleep.214
The situation where counsel is asleep during a trial is more analogous
to the situation where a defendant is without counsel than where a
defendant claims that counsel acted improperly. During the time that
counsel is asleep, a defendant is without counsel. A defendant cannot
consult with a dozing attorney and an attorney who misses key testi-
mony while asleep will not be able to adequately cross-examine wit-
nesses. 2 15 Courts should presume prejudice when a defendant's
counsel sleeps, just as courts presume prejudice if counsel is absent, if
counsel is not admitted to the bar, or if counsel is present but refuses
to participate in the trial.
In addition to the similarity between sleeping counsel and no coun-
sel, several of the factors courts consider in deciding not to require
prejudice are present in situations involving sleeping counsel. In such
situations, it is often difficult, if not impossible, to ascertain what prej-
udice a defendant suffered while counsel slept. The evil lies not in
what counsel did, but in what counsel could have done had he or she
been alert.216 At some point, prejudice becomes inherent in the situa-
tion when counsel is dozing during the trial. Further, sleeping at trial
is a deficiency that is clearly improper for counsel, and generally, the
court will be aware of the sleeping and should take steps to remedy
the problem.
Implicit in the Strickland presumptions is the difficulty in deter-
mining whether or not counsel's actions were strategy decisions. How-
ever, where counsel is unconscious, counsel's actions clearly are not
strategy decisions. One of Justice Marshall's general concerns about
the Strickland test was: "The difficulties of estimating prejudice after
the fact are exacerbated by the possibility that evidence of injury to
the defendant may be missing from the record precisely because of the
incompetence of defense counsel."2 17 Where counsel is asleep, the dif-
ficulty of estimating prejudice can be insurmountable.
212. Id. at 689. Although the main effect of this presumption is on the first prong of
the Strickland test in determining the reasonableness of counsel's conduct, the
presumption underlies both prongs of the Strickland test.
213. Id. at 691-92.
214. "Of course, the buried assumption in our Strickland cases is that counsel is pres-
ent and conscious to exercise judgment, calculation and instinct, for better or
worse. But that is an assumption we cannot make when counsel is unconscious
at critical times." Tippins v. Walker, 77 F.3d 682, 687 (2d Cir. 1996).
215. See Javor v. United States, 724 F.2d 831, 834 (9th Cir 1984).
216. See id. at 835. See also Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 490 (1978).
217. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 710 (1984)(Marshall, J., dissenting).
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For example, if counsel sleeps through the testimony of a witness,
it is difficult to judge what additional impact counsel's cross-examina-
tion would have had if counsel would have been conscious during the
direct examination. Such prejudice can be shown in certain circum-
stances, and indeed must be shown for an ineffectiveness claim where
a defendant claims that a non-sleeping counsel did not do a suffi-
ciently vigorous cross-examination. Yet, it is a difficult burden to
meet and such a difficult burden should not be placed upon an indi-
gent defendant who was appointed sleepy counsel. A court would not
allow defense counsel to be absent during direct examination of a wit-
ness because it is essential for a defendant's rights that counsel be
present.21 8 Similarly, there is no true distinction between counsel's
absence when counsel is in another town and when counsel is in the
Land of Nod.219
The Strickland test is a difficult one for a defendant to meet, and it
is unfair for a defendant to have to make the difficult prejudice show-
ing when she can show that, in effect, she had no counsel at all due to
counsel's impairment. "The Sixth Amendment recognizes the right to
the assistance of counsel because it envisions counsel's playing a role
that is critical to the ability of the adversarial system to produce just
results."2 2 0 As the Court in Strickland noted, "The benchmark for
judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel's con-
duct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process
that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result."221
At some point, sleeping defense counsel undermines the proper func-
tioning of the adversarial process. Therefore, a court should presume
prejudice where defense counsel sleeps during trial.
Still, if a presumption of prejudice is to apply in sleeping attorney
cases, there should be a threshold test. Prejudice should not be pre-
sumed where counsel's head bobs as if falling asleep for a brief mo-
Seemingly impregnable cases can sometimes be dismantled by good de-
fense counsel. On the basis of a cold record, it may be impossible for a
reviewing court confidently to ascertain how the government's evidence
and arguments would have stood up against rebuttal and cross-examina-
tion by a shrewd, well-prepared lawyer.... [Ilt seems to me senseless to
impose on a defendant whose lawyer has been shown to have been in-
competent the burden of demonstrating prejudice.
Id.
218. See Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80 (1976)(reversing conviction where coun-
sel not permitted to confer with client during overnight recess); Herring v. New
York, 422 U.S. 853 (1975)(reversing state conviction where state statute barred
final summation by defense counsel); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335
(1963)(counsel absent at trial); Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961)(counsel
absent at arraignment).
219. "[U]nconscious or sleeping counsel is equivalent to no counsel at all." Javor v.
United States, 724 F.2d 831, 834 (9th Cir. 1984).
220. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685 (1984).
221. Id. at 686.
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ment during the testimony of an unimportant witness. One test used
by the lower courts is the Ninth Circuit Javor test, which allows a
presumption of prejudice "when an attorney for a criminal defendant
sleeps through a substantial portion of the trial."222 This test was
criticized by the Second Circuit because the Javor court did not ex-
plain what was meant by "substantial," which could refer to the length
of time counsel slept, the significance of the proceedings, or the pro-
portion of the proceedings missed.223
In Tippins, the Second Circuit instead presumed prejudice if"coun-
sel was repeatedly unconscious at trial for periods of time in which
defendant's interests were at stake."224 The Tippins court, however,
in an attempt to try to cure the vagueness of the Javor test, fashioned
a test that is too rigid and will not adequately protect a defendant's
right to a fair trial in all situations. The Tippins requirement that
counsel be asleep for "repeated and prolonged" lapses does not ade-
quately address situations where counsel only sleeps during the testi-
mony of one key witness. The Tippins court's extended discussion of
whether or not counsel was actually unconscious suited the facts of
that case because testimony from several witnesses left no doubt that
counsel was snoring, dropping his pen, and being awakened by his cli-
ent.2 25 Yet, in some situations a defendant will be effectively without
counsel when counsel is repeatedly drifting in and out of sleep and
perhaps does not appear completely unconscious to observers during a
prolonged time.
While the Javor "substantial portion" test does not give specific
guidance to courts, the Tippins test is too narrow. In fashioning its
rule, the Tippins court did not give enough weight to the following
passage it quoted from Strickland:
Most important, in adjudicating a claim of actual ineffectiveness of counsel, a
court should keep in mind that the principles we have stated do not establish
mechanical rules. Although those principles should guide the process of deci-
sion, the ultimate focus of inquiry must be on the fundamental fairness of the
proceeding whose result is being challenged. In every case the court should be
concerned with whether, despite the strong presumption of reliability, the re-
sult of the particular proceeding is unreliable because of a breakdown in the
adversarial process that our system counts on to produce just results.2 2 6
By creating a strict rule requiring repeated and prolonged lapses of
unconsciousness, the Tippins court failed to adequately address other
situations where counsel's sleeping causes a "breakdown in the adver-
sarial process." Although courts need more guidance than the Javor
222. Javor v. United States, 724 F.2d 831, 833 (9th Cir. 1984).
223. Tippins v. Walker, 77 F.3d 682, 685 (2d Cir. 1996).
224. Id. at 687.
225. Id. at 688-89.
226. Id. at 687 (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 696 (1984)).
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test, perhaps judges need more discretion than the Tippins test to ade-
quately protect the right to a fair trial.
Courts should apply a refined version of the Javor and Tippins
tests, presuming prejudice: (1) if counsel sleeps through a relatively
large portion of the overall trial proceedings; (2) if counsel sleeps dur-
ing a large amount of time; or (3) if counsel sleeps through specific
critical portions of the trial. Because every case differs factually,
courts should have some discretion in determining what constitutes
"sleeping," although an attorney with her eyes closed should not auto-
matically be found to be sleeping. This test will presume prejudice
where counsel sleeps 10 minutes of a one-hour trial, where counsel
sleeps several different times over a 30-day trial, and where counsel
sleeps only during crucial portions of the testimony of the state's key
witness. In each of these situations, a defendant was effectively with-
out counsel.2 27 Courts would find a Sixth Amendment violation in
these cases if counsel were absent for the same amounts of time, and
they should find such a violation if counsel is asleep. The Javor test
probably would only presume prejudice in the first situation (where
counsel slept during a "substantial portion" of the trial), while the Tip-
pins test likely would only presume prejudice in the second situation
("where there were 'repeated and prolonged lapses"). Prejudice, how-
ever, should be presumed in both situations, as well as the situation
where counsel sleeps during critical portions of the trial.
The proposed test will not result in a rash of victories for defend-
ants claiming ineffective assistance of counsel. First, the situation of
sleeping counsel is, hopefully, rare. There are not many published
cases involving sleeping counsel. One hopes this means there are not
a lot of cases where counsel falls asleep during trial and, even in those
few cases where counsel does doze off, one hopes the trial judges are
capable of observing and remedying the situation-either by calling a
recess or appointing new counsel before it becomes a problem of con-
stitutional magnitude.
Second, the test is not especially easy for a defendant to meet. It is
difficult for a defendant to pinpoint evidence of exactly how much
overall time counsel slept or of exactly when counsel was sleeping.
Unless someone is closely observing counsel during the trial, it will
not be easy to pinpoint this information, except perhaps in the more
extreme cases. In cases where a defendant cannot make enough show-
ing that counsel slept, the Strickland test would apply.22s Still, in
227. Additionally, as in the absence of counsel cases, harmless error analysis should
not apply when the sleeping occurs during a "critical stage" of the proceedings.
See supra note 94.
228. See United States v. Petersen, 777 F.2d at 484 (holding that where attorney had
not been sleeping during a substantial portion of the trial, as required by Javor,
the defendant has to show prejudice under Strickland).
1996]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
those cases where a defendant can meet the burden to make a suffi-
cient factual showing of sleeping in one or more of the three prongs of
the proposed test, a court should not also require a defendant to show
prejudice. If counsel sleeps during a large portion of the trial, during a
large amount of time, or during the admission of critical evidence, the
prosecution's case is not subjected to meaningful adversarial testing
and a defendant is denied the constitutional right to effective assist-
ance of counsel.
C. Proposed Standard for Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Cases Involving Defense Attorneys Who are
Intoxicated or Otherwise Substantially Mentally
Impaired
In the continuum from no counsel to competent counsel, situations
involving counsel who are impaired due to substance abuse or mental
ailments are more analogous to situations involving attorneys with a
conflict of interest than situations involving competent counsel with
no impairments. Impaired attorneys, in fact, often effectively have a
conflict of interest. For example, attorneys who are under the influ-
ence of drugs during a trial have a conflict of interest between their
drug use and their responsibilities to their client. The abuse of drugs
or alcohol during trial conflicts with counsel's duty to provide the best
possible representation to the client.
The "evil" of allowing defendants to be represented by mentally im-
paired attorneys is similar to the evil of representation of conflicting
interests. The evil
is in what the advocate finds himself compelled to refrain from doing, not only
at trial but also as to possible pretrial plea negotiations and in the sentencing
process.... And to assess the impact of a conflict of interests on the attorney's
options, tactics, and decisions in plea negotiations would be virtually
impossible."22 9
229. Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475,490-91 (1978). Strickland also explained the
reasoning behind the test for conflict of interest cases:
Moreover, it is difficult to measure the precise effect on the defense of
representation corrupted by conflicting interests. Given the obligation of
counsel to avoid conflicts of interest and the ability of trial courts to
make early inquiry in certain situations likely to give rise to conflicts, it
is reasonable for the criminal justice system to maintain a fairly rigid
rule of presumed prejudice for conflicts of interest.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 692 (1984). It may not always be appar-
ent to the trial court that counsel is operating under a mental impairment, but it
is also not always apparent to courts that counsel has a conflict of interest. How-
ever, in many situations, the trial court will be aware of counsel's impairment or
impairments. See, e.g., People v. Garrison, 765 P.2d 419, 440 (Cal. 1989)(counsel
was arrested for drunk driving during the trial and the trial judge made inquiry
into the matter). Additionally, when counsel is appointed by the court for an indi-
gent defendant, perhaps the court bears some responsibility for the situation.
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For example, counsel's failure to seek out or accept a plea bargain does
not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel without the difficult
showing of prejudice.230 However, the presumption of attorney com-
petence should not prevail in a situation where, as in Bellamy,231 de-
fense counsel was mentally impaired and paranoid, and did not seek
out a plea bargain for those reasons. The strong Strickland presump-
tion that a trial is reliable should not apply when counsel has a mental
impairment. There is a breakdown in the adversarial process when a
defendant is represented by counsel who is drunk, who is impaired by
drug abuse, or who has a substantial mental impairment that affects
his or her ability to represent the client. Our system of justice should
not allow a person who would be put in jail for drunk driving if that
person were operating an automobile to stand before the court as an
advocate for an indigent criminal defendant. In such a situation, the
trial is unreliable, whether or not the defendant can make the difficult
showing of prejudice.
Situations involving mentally impaired attorneys are more analo-
gous to conflict of interest cases than to situations where per se preju-
dice rules apply, such as situations involving sleeping counsel or
counsel whose conduct is especially egregious. In these latter situa-
tions, a criminal defendant is effectively without counsel. Depending
on the degree of impairment, an impaired attorney is better than one
who is unconscious or who refuses to participate in the trial. Like an
attorney with a conflict of interest, a mentally impaired attorney is
often able to operate at some lower level during the trial. Thus, a per
se prejudice rule generally should not apply to situations involving
mentally impaired counsel when the trial court was unaware of the
situation.232
Because mental impairment cases are most like conflict of interest
cases, a standard similar to the conflict of interest standard should
apply to situations where a defendant is claiming ineffective assist-
230. See, e.g., Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58-60 (1985)(holding that Strickland ap-
plies to ineffective claims regarding guilty pleas and finding that the petitioner in
the case did not show prejudice resulting from counsel's advice regarding guilty
plea); Joubert v. Hopkins, 75 F.3d 1232, 1248 (8th Cir. 1996)(holding that the
petitioner failed to show prejudice resulting from lawyer's failure to inform him
that the court would accept a conditional plea); Clark v. Lewis, 1 F.3d 814, 823(9th Cir. 1993)(holding that petitioner failed to show he was prejudiced by coun-
sers alleged failure to advise him of possibility of a "no contest" or "Alford" plea).
231. Bellamy v. Cogdell, 974 F.2d 302, 308 (2d Cir. 1992).
232. Perhaps in some extreme situations, a mentally impaired attorney may be essen-
tially unconscious. In such situations, aper se prejudice rule should apply. Also,
in situations where counsel is obviously impaired and the situation has been
highlighted to the trial court, but the judge makes no effort to remedy the situa-
tion, then perhaps aperse rule should apply as it does in conflict of interest cases
where the trial court was aware of the conflict. See Holloway v. Arkansas, 435
U.S. 475, 488 (1978).
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ance because defense counsel was mentally impaired. In cases where
a defendant claims ineffective assistance of counsel due to counsel's
conflict of interest and an objection was not made at trial, prejudice is
presumed if the defendant shows that counsel "actively represented
conflicting interests" and that "an actual conflict of interest adversely
affected his lawyer's performance."23 3 For impairment cases where
the trial court was unaware of the impairment, courts generally
should apply the following rule: prejudice is presumed if the defendant
shows: (1) counsel was operating under a substantial mental impair-
ment; and (2) that impairment adversely affected the defense lawyer's
performance.
Regarding the first prong of the proposed test, counsel's impair-
ment must be substantial. If counsel has a hangover from a few
drinks the night before or if counsel is taking mild prescription medi-
cation, the impairment is not substantial and prejudice should not be
presumed. Keeping in mind Strickland's warning that mechanical
rules should not apply in the area of ineffective assistance of counsel
claims,23 4 courts should have some leeway in defining "substantial im-
pairment." Impairments, however, that are so severe they would re-
sult in an attorney being disbarred, should be considered as
"substantial." Just as courts presume prejudice when the defense at-
torney does not meet the substantive requirements for admission to
the bar,2 35 prejudice should be presumed where an attorney's impair-
ment would get him disbarred. Under the present state of the law,
attorneys may be so impaired during trial that it contributes to their
subsequent disbarment, but the defendant's conviction stands.236
The "adverse impact" requirement is similar to the requirement for
conflict of interest cases. If a defendant shows that the "substantial
impairment" affected the trial attorney's performance, then the de-
fendant should not have to show prejudice, such as a showing that the
impairment affected the outcome of the trial. The reason for not re-
quiring a showing that the outcome would have been different is that
the Strickland presumption of a fair trial should not apply where an
attorney's performance was affected by a substantial impairment.
One argument against the proposed standard is that defendants
will devote a lot of effort to investigating the personal lives of their
trial attorneys instead of focusing on the outcome of the trial. There
are three problems with this argument. First, such a concern should
not override the constitutional right to a fair trial. "We must come to
realize that the issue in effectiveness of counsel cases is not the culpa-
233. Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 350 (1980).
234. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 696 (1984).
235. See supra Part III.B.
236. See Bellamy v. Cogdell, 974 F.2d 302, 308 (2d Cir. 1992).
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bility of the lawyer but the constitutional right of the client."23 7 Sec-
ond, practically speaking, the proposed test will likely have little effect
on a defendant's investigation of a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel. Even under the Strickland standard, defendants investigate
the personal lives of trial attorneys. Evidence that an attorney was
drunk during trial, even if not resulting in per se prejudice, may still
boost a claim that the attorney's performance was deficient. Third, if
attorneys are abusing drugs during trial or incompetent to be practic-
ing law, they should be investigated, discovered, and encouraged to
seek help. Courts should not be concerned about protecting fellow
members of the bar at the ongoing expense of present and future de-
fendants. Further, such investigations of attorneys' private lives are
often done for disciplinary reasons. If such investigations are relevant
to the future ability to practice law, such investigations are even more
relevant to the ability to practice law during the time period
investigated.
Another argument against the proposed standard is that it may
allow guilty defendants to go free who would not have been set free if
they were required to show prejudice. However, under the proposed
standard, in many of the cases discussed the outcome would still not
be a finding of ineffective assistance of counsel. In many of the cases
discussed, the courts found the attorneys were not impaired. It is only
in cases where a defendant can actually show that counsel was im-
paired that the proposed standard will make a difference. Further,
the remedy for ineffective assistance is a new trial. The defendant
may be found guilty again with an unimpaired counsel.238 Although
one may argue that the new trial result is a waste of judicial re-
sources, one must remember the overall goal of the Sixth and Four-
teenth Amendments is ensuring that all are guaranteed a fair trial.239
Because a trial with an intoxicated defense counsel is not a fair trial,
237. Bazelon, supra note 76, at 25.
238. See generally, Sol Wachtler, Crime and Punishment, THE NEW YoRKER, July 15,
1996, at 72. In this article, former Chief Judge of the New York State Court of
Appeals, Sol Wachtler, notes that when a conviction is reversed based on the ex-
clusionary rule, the new trial, more often than not, results in another conviction.
Id. at 76. He reasons that the result is good because the next time the govern-
ment will be more careful. Id.
239. See, e.g., Bazelon, supra note 74, at 28:
For example, when we reject an ineffectiveness of counsel claim because
the inadequate representation was not prejudicial, we conceal a serious
problem and nourish the mistaken euphoria that our systems for provid-
ing counsel to indigent defendants are alive and doing well. The cost of
this concealment is paid in the loss of fairness to individual defendants
and in the absence of guidance for lawyers .in future cases.
Additionally, if appellate and post-conviction courts do reverse cases where attor-
neys were sleeping or otherwise impaired even where no prejudice has been
shown, trial judges will be more likely to take actions to correct the problems of
sleeping or impaired counsel at the trial level.
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the burden should not be placed on the defendant to show how the
outcome was affected by counsel's intoxication. The proposed stan-
dard still places a large burden on defendants while also protecting
the constitutional right to a fair trial.
VI. CONCLUSION
The right of an individual accused of a crime to have a lawyer
stand by her side is one of the most important guarantees of our con-
stitution. If a defendant is without counsel, many other constitutional
rights become meaningless because the defendant and those rights
have no champion in the courtroom. In order for the right to counsel
to have meaning, the person representing the defendant must do more
than just breathe. Counsel must act as a defender, and as the
Supreme Court has noted since Powell, an attorney in the courtroom
by itself is not enough to guarantee that the constitutional right to
counsel has been fulfilled.240 Even within the framework of the
Strickland general presumption that counsel was competent, there
are situations where that presumption should not apply and prejudice
should be presumed.
The Strickland requirement of showing deficient performance and
prejudice should not apply when counsel sleeps at trial. Although two
circuit courts have developed two separate tests for determining when
a prejudice showing does not have to be made where counsel slept,
neither of those tests adequately address all situations. Instead, a
court should presume prejudice (1) if counsel sleeps through a large
portion of the overall trial proceedings; (2) if counsel sleeps during a
large amount of time during trial; or (3) if counsel sleeps through spe-
cific critical portions of the trial.
In the right to counsel continuum, the situation where counsel is
substantially mentally impaired, including impairment by drugs or al-
cohol, is analogous to situations where counsel acts under a conflict of
interest. Thus, an ineffective assistance test similar to the conflict of
interest test should apply when counsel has a mental impairment that
was not discovered at trial. A court should presume prejudice if a de-
fendant shows that (1) defense counsel was operating under a sub-
stantial mental impairment; and (2) that impairment adversely
affected the defense lawyer's performance.
The Strickland requirement of showing prejudice is inapplicable
when a defendant's trial counsel is asleep or mentally impaired. The
foundation of the Strickland low threshold test for competency is the
240. See, e.g., Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932); Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
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presumption that a defendant had a fair trial.241 This foundation
does not exist when a criminal defendant is represented by an attor-
ney who sleeps or is drunk during the trial. In such situations, de-
fendants are constructively denied the assistance of counsel.242
Hopefully, situations involving drunk or sleeping attorneys will be
rare. However, in the few cases where those situations arise, the pro-
posed standards adequately balance the concerns of avoiding unneces-
sary retrials and ensuring the guarantees of due process and the right
to counsel. The proposed standards are not easy to meet. Often, it
will be difficult to prove that counsel slept or that an attorney's drug
use adversely affected that attorney's performance. Still, when those
difficult showings are made, a defendant should not have the added
burden of showing prejudice. Trial judges and prosecutors, as repre-
sentatives of the state, should bear some responsibility in these
situations.
Finally, defense attorneys play an important role in upholding the
tenets of the Constitution and ensuring that the government obtains
only fair convictions. Even if there were no prejudice in those situa-
tions, the community should not have confidence in a legal system
where men and women are sent to prison or executed243 when their
attorneys slept during a key portion of the trial or when their attor-
neys were legally intoxicated during a critical portion of the trial. The
constitutional right to counsel becomes meaningless when a defendant
is represented by an attorney who is not even alert. Although, as thejudge in Texas noted, the Constitution does not explicitly state that
the defense lawyer has to be awake,244 the constitutional right to
counsel must be the right to competent, awake, and sober counsel.
241. See Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 372 (1993)(citations omitted)(The preju-
dice component "focuses on the question whether counsel's deficient performance
renders the result of the trial unreliable or the proceeding fundamentally
unfair.").
242. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 692 (1984)("[A]ctual or constructive de-
nial of the assistance of counsel altogether is legally presumed to result in
prejudice").
243. For example, John Young was put to death by the State of Georgia on
March 20, 1985.... Young's attorney, who was subsequently disbarred,
was on drugs during Young's trial. The attorney was arrested on state
and federal drug charges shortly after Young's trial, and he later claimed
his attention was not focused on the trial because he was experiencing
personal and family problems.
Douglas W. Vick, Poorhouse Justice: Underfunded Indigent Defense Services and
Arbitrary Death Sentences, 43 BUFF. L. REv. 329, 401 (1995). See also Bright,
supra note 72, at 93 (A lawyer for Judy Haney "showed up so intoxicated one
morning at trial that the judge had no choice except to send the jury away and
lock the lawyer up for a day to dry out. The next morning he brought the jury
back and produced both Ms. Haney and her lawyer from jail. A few days later,
the death penalty was imposed.").
244. Katz, supra note 5, at 10 (quoting Judge Doug Shaver).
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